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This dissertation introduces new quantitative methods to comparative politics. These
include an approximately unbiased missing data treatment, a first order autoregressive
multilevel model for the analysis of cross-sectional longitudinal data, approaches for the
separation of cross-sectional and longitudinal predictor effects to identify aggregation bias
and a model for the empirical analysis of causal direction. Methods are demonstrated on
a model replicating past research on the causes of corruption adding democratic perfor-
mance as a predictor, than a new model of democratic performance is developed to test
Warren’s theoretical propositions that corruption is by nature undemocratic, and finally the
causal direction between corruption and democratic performance is tested empirically. The
analysis includes 186 countries and between 1984 and 2004. Methodologically the findings
show that the missing data treatment is not completely unbiased. Anomalies emerged when
cross-sectional and longitudinal predictor effects were separated as country level predictors
changes significantly across equivalent models. Substantively, corruption and democratic
performance are identified as strong correlates of each other in both models. Contrary to
past research, findings show that former British colonies are more corrupt then non-British
colonies, underpaid government officials are not more likely to be corrupt, trade liberaliza-
tion will raise corruption and the level of oil production has no impact on corruption levels.
The model of democratic performance does not find level of development to be a significant
predictor. Aggregation bias was identified for two correlates of corruption, stability and (in
one of the models) democratic performance. Causal analysis showed that causal direction
goes from democratic performance to corruption. This suggests that IMF and World Bank
policies of lowering corruption before structural adjustment is granted are misguided.
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HE goal of this dissertation is to introduce new quantitative methods
applicable to the field of comparative political-economic research. First
I will propose a method that is an approximately unbiased approach
to deal with missing data in cross-sectional longitudinal datasets. This method al-
lows researchers to move away from convenient samples where countries are excluded
due to missing data, and under certain assumptions produce unbiased results for all
countries where at least some data is available making their research more generaliz-
able. Next I propose a first order autoregressive multilevel model that is better for
analyzing relationships in cross-sectional longitudinal data then pooled time series as
it makes less assumptions and has more statistical power. Through special center-
ing techniques the proposed approach allows for the decomposition of longitudinal
and cross-sectional predictor effects of time varying covariates. And finally I will
also introduce a structural equation model to estimate causal direction between the
proposed relationships.
I will demonstrate these methods through an extensive analysis of two related
political-economic constructs: corruption and democratic performance. To date re-
2searchers have not done a thorough analysis of the relationship between corruption
and democratic performance. This is a great test case to demonstrate the proposed
methods. In the dissertation I will conduct three analyses, first, replicating past re-
search on the causes of corruption, second, developing a model to validate a theoreti-
cally proposed impact of corruption on democratic performance and finally, evaluating
the causal direction between corruption and democratic performance.
Studies that empirically evaluates the predictors of corruption are scarce. Only a
handful of studies are published evaluating the causes of corruption. None of them
include a good measure of democratic performance as a predictor of corruption. Treis-
man comes closest by including a dichotomous variable for uninterrupted democracy
between 1950 and 1995 (2000). He argues that countries with established democratic
institutions are less likely to be corrupt. Accountability to the public will have offi-
cials’ concerned to blatantly use their public offices for private gains. If they do so,
the next election they will lose their jobs.
I propose that this argument will hold for all time democratic levels. The impact
of democratic accountability on corruption is not limited to long established demo-
cratic institutions. Where accountability exist in a system, even in new democracies,
corruption (or even perceptions of corruption) will not be tolerated by the public.
Treisman’s measure of democratic performance is a cross-sectional dummy variable.
For this reason it has little chances of explaining large variance in a continuous de-
pendent variable. I replaced this poor measure with a widely accepted approximately
continuous measure of current democratic performance. This allows for the detection
of sensitivity of democratic levels, (democratic accountability). I expect this variable
to be a highly significant predictor of corruption.
Most of these past studies also suffer from lack of sophistication offered by the
newly introduced methods. Most empirical evaluation of the causes of corruption only
3utilizes a single cross-section apparently assuming that variation is only important
across countries. Colleagues and I have compiled a dataset1 with a time span of
21 years (1984-2004) of 186 countries that includes valid measures of the causes of
corruption identified by past empirical studies. This dataset allows me to analyze
both the cross country and the over time variability isolating two sets of possible
structural variation in both the dependent variable and the predictors.
My first analysis replicates past empirical studies in which corruption is the depen-
dent variable. This analysis uses the newly proposed methods and includes a better,
more sensitive measure of democratic performance then Treisman’s dichotomous un-
interrupted democracy. Since only a few empirical studies exist on the causes of
corruption, I am able to include every predictor proposed by existing empirical evalu-
ations while still keeping the model relatively parsimonious. Compared to past studies
my analysis mostly uses different measures (operationalizations) of the causes of cor-
ruption and corruption itself. Replication with different methods and measures is at
the core of scientific research. This is the most basic contribution of my dissertation.
My study also sheds light on possible ecological fallacies that stem from the ag-
gregation bias of cross-sectional evaluations. In this model I separate the longitudinal
effects of predictors from the cross-sectional ones to show if the established relation-
ships are driven by short term (within 21 years) or long term (over 21 year) processes
(or both). Short term processes appear as longitudinal (within country) predictors,
while long term processes are significant across countries. Long term divergence that
is beyond the time span studied is best measured by differences between cases.
The more encompassing sample and long time span is a major improvement over
past studies that used convenient cross-sectional samples. In these studies gener-
alizability, statistical power and realm of analytical possibilities suffered. Treisman
1Special Thanks to Andrew Donica who did the bulk of the database work.
4used samples of 31 to 81 depending on the analysis (2000). Sandholtz and Koetzle
used 50 countries (2000). Montinola and Jackman used 51 to 66 countries depending
on available data for the predictors (2002). Studies that move analysis of perceived
corruption to the individual level have even smaller set of countries. Anderson and
Tverdova used 16 (2003) and Atkinson and Seiferling used 33 countries (2006). Leder-
man et al is the only study that utilized longitudinal data (2005), while they were not
clear how many countries their analysis included, they specifically state that one of
their models (with the second largest sample size) included 70 countries. Overall they
analyzed 346 to 1158 observations depending on the model. My analysis includes 186
countries and 3540 observations over 21 years2. This greatly improves the statistical
power and generalizability over the past studies.
Moving on to the second analysis, democratic theorists have not yet considered
corruption an important predictor of democratic performance. No empirical analysis
analyzes the effect of corruption on democratic performance. Warren theorizes that
corruption is inherently undemocratic (2004). When public good is transfered into
private hands of powerful officials, the public suffers a significant loss. In a democracy
public goods and services need to be accessible by all the public, not just the ones
who are willing to pay the price. For this reason corruption is inherently undemo-
cratic. Where corruption pops up, democratic performance automatically suffers.
In my second analysis I propose a model to empirically test Warren’s theory utiliz-
ing the proposed methodological advances. The dependent variable in this model is
democratic performance and corruption is entered as the main predictor of interest.
The literature empirically evaluating democratic performance is vast. Identifica-
tion of all evaluated predictors of democratic performance would yield an unman-
ageable model. I isolate a limited number of predictors that have consistently been
221× 186 is not 3540. I had to exclude countries that did not exist for certain years of analysis.
For example, Ukraine was not a country in the 80’s. Hence the mathematical inconsistency
5shown to predict democratic performance well. These are included in the above cited
dataset and entered into the model of democratic performance as controls to achieve
a parsimonious and fully specified model.
And finally I will conduct an analysis of the causal direction between corruption
and democratic performance. Past empirical studies of corruption also suffer from a
normative bias. They all assume corruption is inherently bad. This is also in line with
the focuses of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have
conditioned structural adjustment aid packages on lowering corruption (van de Walle
2001). Considering the goals of these organizations are to liberalize underdeveloped
countries (often through democratization) withholding of structural adjustment aid
is a severe step.
I will not argue with the viewpoint that corruption is bad, but I propose that these
policies are misguided. This line of thinking assumes that corruption is the cause of
lack of democratic performance, i.e. if we drive down corruption, liberalization and
democratization will occur. But if we liberalize or democratize a country, corruption
could also diminish. I reduce this dilemma to an empirical question and in the third
analysis I conduct a test of causal direction.
Advocates of current World Bank policies have argued that corruption is bad for
economic performance (Mauro 1995). Correlations have been established to back up
these claims. But empirical studies all assumed that corruption is the cause, but none
of these studies have tested the causal direction. It is possible that corruption is an
effect of poor economic or political performance. It is also possible that the causally
it is bi-directional making the relationship a viscous cycle where changes in one is
feeding changes in the other producing a feedback loop. The methods I propose
in this dissertation is be able to establish the causal direction between democratic
performance and corruption.
6The dissertation consists of 8 chapters. This introductory chapter is chapter 1.
Chapter 2 is an extensive review of the literature. Chapter 3 describes the data
used. Chapter 4 describes the quantitative methods, which include the treatment
of missing data, the multilevel modeling of corruption and democratic performance
including description of how the cross-sectional and longitudinal predictor effects were
separated, and the explanation of the causal model. Chapter 5 explores the data
and establishes the appropriateness of the modeling techniques selected. Chapter 6
contains extensive diagnostics of the missing data treatment. Chapter 7 consists of




As it is defined by organizations that study the phenomenon, corruption is the unlaw-
ful use of public office for private gain (International Country Risk Guide: A Business
Guide to Political Risk for International Decisions 2004). Corruption is a word with
negative connotations. And this study will not contest this. In fact, the purpose of
this study is to extract the normative element of corruption and study the phenomena
more objectively than the literature of the past near 40 years.
A Comprehensive study that objectively evaluated both the benefits and costs
of corruption was Nye’s (1967) article. Nye proposed a theoretical foundation that
discussed both the costs and benefits of corruption. He suggested that corruption
can lead to economic development as it produces capital (the money changing hands)
which is a scarce resource in less developed and communist nations, it cuts red tape,
thus increasing the efficiency of some processes, and helps develop entrepreneurship
that can overcome traditional biases (like ethnic divisions) and move toward a mar-
ket system that cares primarily about money. The attitude that, if you can buy it,
8I do not care who you are, where you are from, or what group you belong to. Fur-
thermore, corruption can be a significant tool of integration for elites by diminishing
differences between wealthy elites and powerful elites, decreasing the chance of con-
flict. Corruption in the form of small gifts can ease tensions between officials and the
public. These gifts can travel both ways, with the public trying to please officials for
personal gain and officials trying to please the public to further their position (vote
buying, pork barrel legislation, etc.) (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth 1997). Corruption
can also finance important political institutions and provide incentives to maintain
these institutions (Nye 1967). The financing of political parties is an important issue
even in the most developed democracies. It is not uncommon that their existence is
maintained through the use of “dirty, corrupt” money.
Nye also cites anti-corruption arguments (1967). Corruption wastes resources.
Dirty money often lands in Swiss banks, and is therefore a loss to the country. Cor-
ruption can create investment distortions as money is channeled into sectors where it
can disappear, rather than sectors where the rules of the market suggest competitive
advantage. Corruption wastes skills that public officials should be spending to better
their country, not their private gain. Critics of corruption fear that high corruption
countries will receive less aid because donors want to maximize the money which
reaches their intended targets. Corruption can contribute to instability by undermin-
ing the legitimacy of government. Corruption is often cited as a reason for coups and
ethnic revolts. And finally, corruption can reduce government capacity. Civil servants
become scarcer once the injustices in the system become apparent and government
legitimacy diminishes.
The debate continued into the 80’s. Johnston labeled the two camps of corruption
researcher the “revisionists”, discussing the benefits of corruption, and the “moralists”
who argued that corruption, by its illegal and illegitimate nature, is inherently bad.
9has continued into the 80’s (1986). Johnston identified a third group (without a fancy
label) who argue that corruption’s impact depends on political context.
Up to this point in history, corruption was predominantly a theoretical concept.
Empirical evaluations were based on anecdotal evidence of exposed cases. The 90’s
brought quantitative empirical work to the discussion of corruption. With the quan-
titative work on corruption all discussion of the possible benefits of corruption has
disappeared.
Empirical quantitative corruption research suffers from a major problem. The
problem of measurement. Corruption is, by definition, illegal, therefore all parties
involved have a strong incentive to deny it. For this reason the traditional approach
of direct measurement through self-report is unlikely to be reliable as it will under-
measure corruption due to the socially desirable response. People generally do not
want to admit that they have broken the law.
Measurement through public records is also not feasible. Corruption is not re-
ported to a public organization. Public records only contain cases where the corrup-
tion was exposed. Exposed cases are usually a small fraction of corrupt activity and
it is impossible to know how much corruption has gone unexposed.
The most common strategy for corruption measurement is indirect. Organiza-
tions that compile corruption scores (e.g. Transparency International, Economic In-
telligence Unit, World Bank, International Country Risk Guide) do so by surveying
experts about how much corruption there is in the country of interest. One advantage
of surveying experts versus the general public or public officials is a decreased social
desirability bias and an improved construct validity.
One of the criticisms of corruption research is the cross-culturally diverse concep-
tion of corruption. An action that is perceived as corruption in Europe might be
considered normal in a developing nation. The utilization of information reported by
10
international and local experts insures a more homogeneous conception of corruption.
The downside to this approach is that it measures hearsay. People’s conceptions
about corruption levels within a country might not reflect actual corruption levels.
It might be a function of scrutiny of the press, strength of political opposition, or
cultural characteristics like public pessimism. No study to date has attempted to
control for these characteristics, and it is beyond the scope of this project to do so.
Alternative approaches to the study of corruption have been proposed. Atkin-
son and Seiferling (2006) used the World Values Study which fielded a survey in 52
countries to a random sample of the public. One question on this survey was about
corruption. The authors found that public perceptions of corruption correlate well
with expert reviews.
In addition to comparisons with expert review measures they conducted a multi-
level analysis that analyzed both individual level perceptions of corruption and state
level differences. They found that 77% of the variance in perceived corruption levels
is individual level variation. Apparently people within a certain country do not agree
much on how corrupt their country is. Only 23% of the variance was accounted for by
state level differences (using 33 out of the 52 countries) (Atkinson & Seiferling 2006).
This shows that there is room for researchers to move corruption analysis from
the state level to the individual level since 77% of the variation comes from there.
Atkinson and Seiferling proceeded to evaluate what individual characteristics predict
if someone’s perception of corruption will be high or low (2006). Additional research
is needed in this area but for the purposes of this dissertation the level of analysis
will remain on the state level.
Another alternative to the measurement of corruption has been proposed by
Golden and Picci (2005), who suggest that a good proxy for corruption is the “dif-
ference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and
11
the cumulative price government pays for public capital stocks.” Unfortunately, this
approach is also flawed, as an accurate pricing of actual infrastructure is virtually im-
possible. This approach also has trouble disentangling corruption from actual market
inefficiencies which stem from non-corruption driven sources.
Finally, Wedeman has proposed the use of public records of corruption. The
problem with this approach is that public records only capture corruption that is
caught (revealed rate of corruption), leaving out all corruption that went unexposed
(Wedeman 2004a, Wedeman 2004b). With proper controls this could be a reasonable
approach.1 But it is important to note that such an approach could only work in a
single legal system, like provinces of China, Cantons of Switzerland, the states of the
US or, in the long run possibly, the countries of the European Union. This approach
to measurement will not be possible for an all-encompassing cross-national study.
All approaches considered, the most accessible and valid approach is expert-
perceived corruption scores, as collected by agencies specializing in the compilation
of this data. This type of data is available for long time series and for a large number
of countries. It has the best construct validity and cross-country comparability. This
study will use such corruption data.
The availability of scored corruption levels has opened the door for empirical anal-
ysis of corruption. Empirical studies look at how corruption influences other concepts
of interest, and also try to explain corruption with its correlates. Mauro has empir-
ically shown that corruption has a negative impact on investment (1995). Seligson’s
study focused on corruption’s impact on regime legitimacy (2002). Anderson and
Tverdova looked at how attitudes toward government are influenced by corruption
levels (2003).
The first, and to date most comprehensive, study that tries to explain corrup-
1Dr. Wedeman and I are working on such a corruption model for China.
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tion levels directly comes from Treisman (2000). He analyzed three cross-sections
(1996,1997,1998) and finds that colonial heritage, with the political culture that stems
from it, is the strongest predictor of corruption. Countries with British colonial pasts
and common law systems will have less corruption. Treisman also makes a Weberian
argument that Protestant ethics stem corruption, and finds an indirect relationship
between the percent of Protestants living in a country and corruption.
Treisman also found that 46 years of uninterrupted democratic performance (from
1950-1995) is a strong correlate of corruption. In his sensitivity analysis he used
smaller time periods and found that 10-30 years of democratic past is not correlated
to corruption consistently in the three cross-sections. 40 or 46 years of democratic
performance on the other hand is2. He interpreted this as current levels of democratic
performance does not impact corruption (even though his dichotomous measures was
not measuring current levels of democratic performance.) Treisman also uses an
extensive set of controls, of which some affected corruption more or less consistently
across different formulations and sensitivity analyses of the model. I will use these
controls as the foundation of my causes of corruption model. These will be discussed
in detail in the next chapter.
The same year Treisman’s study came out, Sandholtz and Koetzle attempted to
explain corruption (2000). They used significantly fewer correlates, and confirmed all
the hypothesized relationships. Sandholtz and Koetzle also found that Protestantism
has a significant impact on corruption levels. Furthermore, they found that average
income (measured by per capita GDP), state control of economic activities (measured
by personal economic freedom levels), democratic performance, democratic traditions,
and trade integration (measured by export and import shares of GDP) were strong
predictors of corruption levels. Treisman also controlled for most of these economic
2All of these variables were dichotomous. Models were run separately.
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and political factors through these or different proxies.
Lederman and colleagues showed that once political institutions are introduced
into models explaining corruption, the impact of openness and legal traditions (i.e. colo-
nial heritage and cultural factors) disappears (2005). They suggest that freedom of
the press, democratic institutions (including parliamentary or non-parliamentary leg-
islative structures), and stability are the more appropriate set of correlates.
Montinola and Jackman also conducted a cross-country study of the causes of
corruption using some never before used correlates (2002). In line with past research,
they found that low income countries are more corrupt. They also tested size of
government and found that it does not influence corruption levels. OPEC countries,
on the other hand, tend to be more corrupt. (Treisman suggested that countries
with large natural resource endowments might be more corrupt, but did not specif-
ically single out oil (2000)). Montinola and Jackman also claimed that underpaid
government workers tend to be more corrupt, though they failed to provide sufficient
empirical backing for this claim (2002).
The cited empirical studies suffer from both ideological and methodological falla-
cies. Ideologically, all of them have a deep rooted notion that corruption has to be
diminished. While normatively this is a valid argument, the system of relationships
between political economic constructs need to be considered more deeply to under-
stand the causes and effects of corruption. While the studies cited above assumed
that corruption is either a cause or an effect, none of them went as far as empirically
testing it.
The IMF and World Bank has a long history of withholding assistance from highly
corrupt countries (van de Walle 2001). This makes sense as corrupt officials could eas-
ily channel the assistance to their Swiss bank accounts. This has numerous negative
consequences. Contributors of aid might be shied away from helping in the future.
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The aid might be completely worthless, as the real target of the aid (the public) might
not benefit from it. Of course, aid granting institutions have numerous tools at their
disposal to minimize this kind of behavior. Conditioning aid on trimming corruption
is only one, and possibly a highly misguided one. The structural difficulties posed by
corruption for granting assistance does not directly translate to a causal relationship
that corruption causes low democratic performance.
If corruption is a cause of poor democratic performance, trimming corruption
would be necessary before a country can really democratize. But what if the rela-
tionship is the other way around? What if corruption is natural in undemocratic
countries? Then it is poor democratic performance that should be battled and lower
corruption levels will come naturally. Well targeted assistance is an effective way to
battle low democratic performance. The lack of consideration of this possibility is
the ideological fallacy of the existing literature.
The competing hypotheses on the direction of causation have been reduced to an
empirical question. Does corruption cause democratic performance, or vice versa?
This dissertation will empirically test the causal relationship.
Turning to the methodological problems of the existing literature, none of the
cited studies considered longitudinal relationships; all were cross-sectional analyses,
even when some longitudinal data was available.3 One danger of cross-sectional anal-
ysis is the heightened possibility of ecological fallacies, also known as aggregation
bias. In a certain time slice, if high levels of corruption are also associated with low
levels of GDP, this is often interpreted as causation (i.e. high corruption will cause
low growth or low growth will cause high corruption). It is also often implicitly in-
terpreted longitudinally (i.e. a decrease in corruption levels will lead to an increase
in GDP). Neither inference is correct based on a cross-sectional analysis. The only
3For example, Treisman had access to corruption data for three years (2000).
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correct inference in this situation is that high GDP countries have low corruption
levels. Anything beyond this is untested speculation. This dissertation is proposing
a methodology that overcome this problem and replicate the cited works by directly
testing both cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of predictors. It will consider cor-
ruption both as a predictor of democratic performance and as an effect of economic
factors. And finally it will test causal direction between corruption and democratic
performance. To achieve this goal I will utilize annual data from 1984 to 2004, and
advanced analytical methods, both described in detail in chapter 3 and chapter 4,
respectively.
Furthermore, the above cited studies suffered from a sample selection bias either
by design or by consequence. For example, Treisman felt that the analysis should
be restricted to developing nations. I find this approach faulty, as it damages the
generalizability of the analysis. Geddes demonstrated that sample selection can highly
influence findings with comparative political country data (1990). All of the cited
studies of corruption suffer from a convenient sample selection bias and most of them
fail, by design, to consider a theoretically and normatively important group which
serves as a frame of reference for developing nations.
Another problem that often leads to exclusion of cases is missing data. Unfor-
tunately, the traditional treatment for missing data is case exclusion (more formally
called listwise deletion). Listwise deletion produces widely generalizable results only
under stringent assumptions which are not met with political and economic data
(Allison 2001). Therefore the results of the above-cited analyses are not widely gen-
eralizable. My study will utilize a complex modern missing data treatment which
approximates unbiased generalizable results under less stringent assumptions, as-
sumptions that, I argue, are met with political economic data and the dataset of
this study.
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The analysis of the causes of corruption is only one half of this dissertation. An-
other, and significantly less explored, side is the analysis of corruption’s impact on a
country’s democratic performance.
2.2 Democratic Performance
The relationship between democratic performance and corruption came into focus
with Warren’s philosophical discussion (2004). He argued that corruption, by nature,
undermines democracy as it “breaks the link between collective decision-making and
the people’s powers to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the
very link that defines democracy.” Corruption reduces the effective domain of public
action by its conversion to private benefit. It creates the inefficiencies already cited
by Nye (1967), and violates the democratic rights of citizens by putting prices on
public-government transactions. Warren argues that for these reasons, corruption
is inherently undemocratic and hence its existence deteriorates democratic perfor-
mance (2004). It does so by undermining government confidence, raising mistrust
and cynicism, and thus creating deficiencies in democratic performance.
Warren’s arguments were purely theoretical (2004). Past studies have tested
democratic performances’ and democratic institutions’ impact on corruption (Treisman
2000, Lederman, Loayza, & Reis Soares 2005), but Warren suggests different dynamics
in this relationship. Warren argues that increasing corruption will reduce democratic
performance (2004). This creates a theoretical paradox in the direction of relationship
that my study strives to sort out. Also, to-date, corruption’s impact on democratic
performance has not been empirically tested. My dissertation will independently
analyze corruption’s predictors and democratic performance’s predictors in separate
analysis and conclude the study with a causal analysis that aims to empirically dis-
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entangle the theoretical inconsistencies in the literature.
To conduct an analysis of democratic performance, a review of this literature is in
order. Democratic performance is more widely studied in comparative politics than
corruption. It is a high priority on the agendas of not only researchers, but policy
makers and politicians. For example, the Bush administration considers the spread
of democracy as a primary global goal. A comprehensive review of the literature on
democracy could take up a full dissertation or even several volumes of books. For
this reason, this section will only touch on the highlights and relevant information for
the purposes of my analysis. The goal is to find the significant predictors to create a
fully specified but parsimonious model of democratic performance.
Since Lipset (1959), economic development has been persistently linked to demo-
cratic performance. Unfortunately there is little agreement as to what measure of
economic development is appropriate for quantitative analysis. But studies have
consistently linked some measure of economic development to democratic perfor-
mance at a significant level (Jackman 1973, Bollen 1979, Bollen 1983, Bollen &
Jackman 1985, Brunk, Caldeira, & Lewis-Beck 1987, Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994)
World system theorists argue that countries at the periphery of the world economy
tend to be authoritarian where the power of the elites is often at least partially de-
pendent on their alliances and support of countries at the core of the world economy
(Chase-Dunn 1975, Wallerstein 1980). For example, the non-democratic Saudi Royal
Family enjoys the full support of the United States even during times when democrati-
zation is a key foreign policy objective. These key relationships are better maintained
in authoritarian settings than in the non-continuity of regime changes that stem from
democratic transitions. For example, the 1973 election of Salvador Allende in Chile
has complicated US-Chile economic and political relationships. On the empirical
side, some measure of position in the world economy has been identified as a signif-
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icant predictor of democratic performance in numerous studies (Bollen 1983, Bollen
& Jackman 1985, Gonick & Rosh 1988, Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994).
Past empirical studies have also verified that traditional political culture inhibits
democratic performance. Bollen (1979) finds Protestant culture as a strong correlate.
From a theoretical point of view this makes sense, as protestant culture stems from
the idea of challenging the status quo, as Martin Luther challenged the Catholic
Church by starting the Reformation (Nolan & Lenski 2005). Pierre Trudeau explains
Quebec’s struggle to develop persistent democratic institutions until the 1960’s as a
function of their catholic heritage (1968). Lipset argues that catholic religious ties
also reinforce secular political alignment making political compromise, an important
institution in democratic government, more difficult (1981). In a later publication he
also argues that protestant colonial heritage “helped to socialize many of their colonial
peoples in democratic politics by providing systems of electoral representation and
local governance prior to independence” (Lipset, Seong, & Torres 1993).
Given the size of the democratic performance literature, numerous other possi-
ble predictors could be identified. Unlike the model of corruption, where only a few
studies guide my research, a model of democratic performance could grow to near in-
finity if all past hypothesized relationships were considered and incorporated into the
model. Parsimony is an important requirement of social science research. The point
where a model loses its meaning due to size is hard to identify. For the analysis of
democratic performance, I identified predictors that have consistently yielded signifi-
cant results in the studies of the past 50 years: world position, economic development
and colonial heritage.
It is important to draw an additional distinction between my proposed model
of corruption and my proposed model of democratic performance. With the model
of corruption I take substantive interest in all predictors, as I plan to contribute to
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the literature from all angles, not just by proposing democratic performance as a
new correlate. With my democracy model all I care about is corruption’s impact on
democratic performance. I do not wish to test other proposed correlates or identify
new ones. Controls are only included to ensure that the model is not underidentified.
This line of thinking leads to a significantly smaller and more parsimonious model of




The most difficult task for this study was compiling an appropriate dataset. The
most widely used corruption rating organization, Transparency International (TI),
only started reporting countries’ corruption scores in 1995. Treisman used TI in his
study. When I considered the use of TI data I conducted an analysis of variance
and found that over 95% of the variance was driven by cross-sectional differences
and less than 5% of the variance was longitudinal for an 8 year span (1995-2002).
The extremely low longitudinal variance for Transparency International data is un-
derstandable, as it encompasses a decade where political and economic transitions
were slowing down. The initial year of TI data is the same year democracy researcher
(and Journal of Democracy editor) Larry Diamond first expressed concerns about the
slowdown of democratic transitions that became known as the third wave (Hunting-
ton 1993, Diamond 1995). Since the longitudinal aspect of the data analysis is a key
improvement over past studies, I looked for data sources with a longer time frame.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) academic database provided af-
fordable1 annual data from 1984 to 2004 and included a 6 point corruption rating
1I would like to thank the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Political Science for
supporting my project and purchasing this dataset.
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measuring “actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepo-
tism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close
ties between politics and business” (International Country Risk Guide: A Business
Guide to Political Risk for International Decisions 2004). Due to the longer time
span the variance within countries is increased to 27.8%. (The variance decomposi-
tion of all time varying variables are reported in Table 5.2). The ICRG dataset also
included measures of government stability and ethnic tensions, which were variables
I also utilized. Beyond the larger time span of the ICRG dataset it was also highly
comprehensive as it included data on 145 countries.2 The scale of the corruption was
reversed for easier intuitive interpretation. Originally high scores meant low levels of
corruption.
For measures of democratic performance, two widely accepted datasets were freely
available: Freedom House (FH) ratings and the Polity dataset. The Polity dataset
does not include ratings at times of transition. Though Polity provides a dataset they
suggest for use with longitudinal analysis, they warn that the data points provided
during times of transition are rounded linear interpolation between the two available
readings (Polity IV 2006). For this reason I decided to use the FH data.
Freedom House reports two 7 point scores for each country, political freedoms and
civil liberties (where 1 is most democratic and 7 is least democratic). For the time span
of 1984 to 2004 the correlation of these scores are between .9 and .95 so independent
use of the two scores did not make sense due to high collinearity. A 13 point score was
constructed by the following formula 2 − (Political Freedoms + Civil Liberties)
creating a score that ranges from -12 (least democratic) to 0 (most democratic). This
might sound odd at first, but in statistical analysis 0 is considered a baseline, and
the most appropriate baseline in this case is full democracy. These types of scale
2The final dataset used for the analysis included 186 countries. The 22% missing countries will
be appropriately controlled for by the missing data treatment.
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transformation are linear transformations, and therefore will have no impact on the
results of the statistical analysis. FH reported data from 201 countries. 186 were
included in the dataset. The excluded countries were either not considered countries
by most other data sources (like city states, the Vatican, Monaco, Lichtenstein, San
Marino, Hong Kong) or were so isolated from the international community that almost
no data was available on them from other sources (like Afghanistan, Cuba, and North
Korea). The fact that so few cases had to be excluded will strengthen this analysis
over past studies, and will make results widely generalizable. A complete list of
included countries is available in Appendix A. FH data was available for all 186
countries in the dataset.
The full analysis dataset, of course, included all correlates of both corruption and
democratic performance (and even other variables that were instrumental for the
missing data treatment). In the remainder of this chapter I will list these variables,
their measurement properties, and their sources.
Starting with Treisman’s correlates of corruption, which I replaced with time vary-
ing covariates, government stability was a unique function of the number of leaders in
recent years measuring a leader’s ability to stay in power. In my analysis, government
stability is operationalized by a 12 point variable from ICRG. It is composed of three
4 point scores of government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. Overall
it measures “the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its
ability to stay in office” (International Country Risk Guide: A Business Guide to
Political Risk for International Decisions 2004).
Treisman controlled for ethno-linguistic fragmentation score using the Atlas Naro-
dov Mira measurements of the probability that two randomly selected individuals will
not belong to the same ethnic group (Bruk 1964). I replaced this score with ICRG’s
ethnic tension score, measuring “the degree of tension within a country attributable
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to racial, nationality, or language divisions” (International Country Risk Guide: A
Business Guide to Political Risk for International Decisions 2004). This measure is
more appropriate than Treisman’s ethno-linguistic fragmentation, which should have
no impact on any variable of interest unless it is accompanied by tension between the
groups. For ease of interpretation, the score was reversed, as low scores originally
measured high ethnic tension.
Treisman controlled for economic productivity measured by logged per capita PPP
GDP. In my dataset this score was replaced by per capita GDP as the PPP version
was less widely available for former communist countries. The correlation of the PPP
and non-PPP per capita GDP for the years 1984-2004 is between .95 and .98. I expect
that the change will have no impact on the result.
Another control used by Treisman was openness of trade, operationalized by gross
imports as percent of GDP, acquired through the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI). The same source provided me with this data annually for 1984-2004
(World Development Indicators Online 2006).
And finally, Treisman controlled for natural resource endowments measured by
fuel, metal, and mineral production as percent of GDP, also acquired through WDI.
Lead by Montinola and Jackman’s proposition that OPEC countries tend to be more
corrupt (2002), I decided to separate fuel from metals and minerals (which the WDI
allowed), and enter them in the analysis as two separate variables. The WDI, once
again, provided this data for every year of interest (World Development Indicators
Online 2006).
I was not able to find time varying data for a few variables that Treisman entered
as correlates. In all of these cases time varying alternatives would have been more
desirable but were not available. Treisman used average government wage as reported
by the World Bank. This is measured by the Total Government Wage Bill divided
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by the number of central government employees and armed services personnel. To
make results comparable across countries, the dataset used wage ratio to per capita
GDP. Unfortunately, the World Bank does not report this annually. Figures for the
first half of the 1990’s were used (when not available they were substituted by figures
from the second half of the 1990’s).
In order to control for government interference in business, Treisman used the
question: “State interference does not hinder the development of business in your
country” from the World Competitiveness Report (WCR) survey. The WCR is not
publicly available, and only covers a limited number of countries. Sandholtz and
Koetzle also suggested state control of economic activities as a predictor of corruption
(2000). They used economic freedoms data reported by Freedom House. Unfortu-
nately this dataset is also limited to a small number of countries and is not reported
annually. To my surprise, not even the ICRG dataset supplied a measure of gov-
ernment involvement in businesses, which is surprising as this dataset is supposed to
help businesses make good investment decisions.
In 2003 the WDI started reporting how many days it takes to start a business. De
Soto pointed out the importance of this measure as a proxy for bureaucratic quality
and government’s unnecessary involvement in business life (2003). Since reporting
only started in 2003 I have no historical data for the time frame studied. To proxy
for government interference in business I used the 2003 “days to start a business”
data as a non-time varying covariate. I realize that the use of this variable is less
then desirable. I have to make the assumption that the 2003 measure is roughly
representative of the country for whole the time span studied. I am also reducing my
abilities to detect only cross-sectional differences. I am currently seeking out other
possible measures for my future studies. For now, this is a sufficient control variable.
If it produces interesting findings, the pursuit of a better measure is warranted (even
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if it comes with a price tag.)
And finally, Treisman controlled for the percent of population who are Protes-
tants. Since this is a fairly constant number over time, hence longitudinal variance
is ignorable, (and due to non availability of annual data) a non time varying ver-
sion of the variable was used. The World Christian Encyclopedia provided data on
number of Protestants within a country, and WDI total population scores were used
to acquire the percent ratios (Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson 2001, World Development
Indicators Online 2006). Some numbers are estimates in regions where the census
does not directly measure religion.
Treisman also included covariates that are not time varying by definition. These
were British colonial heritage, common law system and federalism. Original research
using CIA World Fact Book (and occasionally Wikipedia) was used to compile these
dichotomous indicators (CIA World Fact Book 2006, Wikipedia 2006). In addition to
British colonial experience, all other colonial data was collected and then separated
into Protestant and Catholic colonies (and, of course, a reference category of “no
colonial past”). This data is be utilized in the analysis of democratic performance.
Turning to the predictors of democratic performance, colonial past was already
mentioned in a previous paragraph. All other controls of democratic performance are
time varying. Economic development I operationalized by oil equivalent of per capita
energy consumption. Today, this is still a valid measure of how developed a country
is. In the future, as environment friendly and energy saving technologies become more
wide spread, this measure will become obsolete. This data was acquired through the
WDI (World Development Indicators Online 2006).
Position in the world economy was constructed by from detailed export data ac-
quired from the United Nation COMTRADE database (United Nations Comtrade
Database 2006). Countries report their trade activities based on the Standard Inter-
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national Trade Classification (SITC). For this study, SITC revision 1 data was used
as in the 1980s only a few countries were reporting based on revision 2 rules. For a
previous project, committee member, Dr. Avery compiled a list of SITC rev. 1 com-
modities that are considered raw materials (list is supplied in Appendix B) (Avery,
Littvay, & Donica 2004). Using export data based on the raw material list divided
by the total exports I calculated the percent of raw material exports. This score was
then reversed (practically turning it into percent of finished goods exported). This
makes more intuitive sense as high values represent a country that was closer to the
core of the world economy while low values place a country on the periphery.
Though the above list has exhausted the variables that will be used in the analyses,
additional variables were included in the dataset. These are necessary because the
missing data procedure used to produce unbiased parameter estimates and standard
errors in the presence of missing data is a model based procedure. The variables
included in the missing data model are the variables that are included in the analysis
and additional variables that could be strong predictors of the pattern of missingness.
In other words, variables that could predict if the value of an analysis variable is
missing or observed. Note that this does not mean they have to be able to predict,
only that they theoretically could predict. For this reason, if there is theoretical reason
for the inclusion of a predictor of the missing data procedure, it should be included
without verification, if the theorized predictor does in fact predict the pattern of
missingness at a significant level. Inclusion of a statistically irrelevant variable will
not hurt the missing data estimation procedure and the literature does suggest that a
broader model should be drawn for the missing data model than used for the analysis
(Allison 2001, Schafer 1997, Little & Rubin 2002).
While numerous available political and economic variables could be justified for
inclusion in the missing data model, I decided to include only 3 additional variables to
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keep the procedure computationally manageable. This is sufficient, as the pattern of
missingness can be easily predicted by most variables that are already in the analysis
model. For example, countries that have missing data tend to be the poorer countries,
the countries that are on the periphery of the world economy, tend to be more corrupt
and less democratic. Since most of these variables come from different sources, it is
unlikely they will all be missing. The variables I decided to add to the missing data
model are additional economic variables: aid, foreign direct investment, and official
development assistance data from the WDI database (World Development Indicators
Online 2006). The reason I decided to use these variables and not others is not
theoretical. From a theoretical point of view I would argue the analysis variables are
sufficient to predict patterns of missingness. But these are variables I plan to use in
my future studies. This way I avoid having to do the missing data treatment twice.
They are the kind of political economic data that should be predictive of missingness.
They are complete, without missing values. Chapter 4 will discuss the missing data




4.1 Missing Data Treatment
Missing data poses a problem in almost every field of social science, and researchers
in many cases do not recognize that the problem exists. Most statistical software
to date is unable to appropriately deal with missing data by default, while the soft-
ware that has some advanced missing data procedure implemented requires a string
of additional steps that most social scientists do not take (e.g. using Proc MI and
Proc MIANALYZE in SAS (SAS 9.1.3 Intelligence Platform User’s Guide 2005),
use of multiple imputation in MlWin (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser 2005)).
It is also not uncommon that the “advanced” missing data procedure implemented
produces biased results (e.g. overconfident standard errors in SPSS (SPS 2004, Hill
1997)). Some software does have missing data procedures implemented that by default
(or by changing a single parameter) produce unbiased results, (HLM (Raudenbush,
Bryk, Cheong, & Jr. 2004) or Mplus (Muthe´n & Muthe´n 2006)) but the assumptions
this software makes about missing data are important to consider. Often even these
packages have stringent limitations on missing data (e.g. HLM can only deal with
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missing data on response variables; for missing predictors some information is often
discarded).
The most common default missing data treatment is listwise deletion, or in other
words, omission of the case from the analysis (Allison 2001). This can be an appro-
priate missing data treatment but only under stringent assumptions. Rubin has de-
fined possible patterns of missing data. He categorized missingness into three groups
(Rubin 1976). Missing Completely at Random (MCAR), Missing at Random (MAR),
and Missing Not at Random (also referred to as Not Missing at Random, MNAR,
or NMAR). MCAR, as its name suggests, assumes that missing data is completely
random and incidental. MAR, contrary to what its name suggests, does not assume
that data is missing at random. It assumes that the pattern of missingness (i.e. if a
value is missing or observed) can be predicted by other observed values in the dataset.
To illustrate this with an example, survey respondents often refuse to offer what their
income is. They do not do this randomly; low income people tend to refuse response
much more than high income people. But if we have other information in our dataset
that would predict income (e.g. rent or own home, blue or white collar job, number of
days a month when eating out, the amount of money spent on vacation, etc.) these
could be strong predictors of missingness making the missingness MAR. NMAR
assumes that the pattern of missingness is not predicted by other variables in the
dataset. So using the previous example, if I failed to collect correlates of income, or
more precisely, correlates that could predict the missingness for the income variable,
I would have NMAR missing data.
MCAR is very often an unrealistic assumption in the social sciences. The only
case where missingness can be assumed to be MCAR is when the data is missing by
design. For example, a researcher wants to administer a 100citem survey to 10 year
olds. This researcher knows that an average 10 year old cannot deal with more than
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60 surveycitems. This researcher can decide to split the participants into two groups
randomly and administer half of the survey to half of the participants and the other
half of the survey to the rest. This way the researcher will have to face the issue of
decreased power, but will alleviate the bias from survey fatigue. There are analytical
methods such as full information maximum likelihood estimation that can produce
unbiased estimates when analyzing such data (Graham, Hofer, & MacKinnon 1996).
Listwise deletion is also an appropriate method when the pattern of missing data is
MCAR, though in this case has to be aware of the lost power that stems from deleting
cases (Allison 2001). If somebody wanted to analyze the relationship between two
variables, one that was on the first version of the survey and another that was on the
second version of the survey, listwise deletion would delete all cases in the dataset
leaving the researcher with nothing to analyze. With full information maximum
likelihood this would not be a problem.
MAR on the other hand is often a defendable assumption within the social sci-
ences. I already provided a survey research example for achieving MAR missingness
with self reported income. I would also argue that political economic data used in
this study is mostly MAR by nature. Missingness is often the function of the lack of
integration into the international community, not reporting to large data collection
agencies like the UN or the World Bank. Missing data is usually a problem with poor
countries, undemocratic countries, and highly corrupt countries. Since the dataset I
assembled uses data from numerous sources, making at least some data available for
all included countries (e.g. I have democratic performance data for all countries) I
am making the claim that the MAR assumption is reasonable. Therefore I selected
a missing data treatment that produces approximately unbiased results if the MAR
assumption is met.
Please note that this is a better approach than what preceding researchers have
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done. Political economic researchers are more careful than survey researchers who
tend to default to listwise deletion. Researchers of comparative politics usually note
that the generalizability of their study is limited by their sample. While I applaud
the honesty of these researchers regarding the limitations of their studies, here I strive
to achieve the most widely generalizable results. Their approach is not an option for
me.
MAR is an assumption that can not be tested (Potthoff, Tudor, Pieper, & Hasselblad
2006). To date, most books on missing data claim that the assumption of MAR is
not testable (Schafer 2001) and therefore the appropriateness of such an assumption
has to be made on theoretical grounds.
The question of missing data becomes more complex for nested data structures
like the longitudinal data I utilize in my analysis. For non-nested data, missingness is
limited to two forms: Unit missing, where no information is available on a unit that
should be included in the dataset (e.g. a sampled individual refuses the interview) and
item missing, where onecitem from one unit is missing from the dataset (e.g. someone
refuses to answer one survey question) (Rubin 2004). For longitudinal data structures,
an added complication enters this picture. citem missing for my purposes is when one
country does not report one item in a certain year. Unit missing is when one country
that should be included in the dataset is not included (e.g. Afghanistan, Cuba, or
North Korea, etc. in my case.) This kind of missing data will not be treated, and
thus limits the generalizability of my study. Fortunately I have very few of these.
(Comprehensive list is not included as the appropriate frame of all countries is not
clearly established. See Appendix A for the list of countries included.)
Another possible form of missingness with longitudinal data is wave missing, when
all information is missing for a certain country for a certain year. Fortunately I do
not have this kind of missing data in my dataset, but it is important to mention as
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current multilevel modeling software1 turnscitem missing into wave missing data by
default (Raudenbush & Bryk 2001). For example, if I had missing data for percent of
raw material export for 1991 in Hungary, the whole wave for 1991 would be deleted
for the case of Hungary. This missing data treatment is clearly inefficient as it does
not incorporate all available information in the analysis. It is often cited that multi-
level modeling software deals well with missing data (produces unbiased results), but
unfortunately it only deals well with wave missing on predictors or missing data on
the response variable. It does not deal efficiently withcitem missing. For this reason
a more sophisticated missing data treatment approach was needed than the default
in the available analytical software.
From a theoretical point of view, two additional structures of missing data can
emerge in longitudinal data. Neither has received much attention, and therefore
neither has a catchy name. One is when data is missing for every case (country) for
a certain year. While this is not a problem here, this is a common phenomenon that
is not considered problematic. This problem can be reformulated as unequal times
between readings in a panel design. While traditional ANOVA/ANCOVA/MANOVA
based repeated measures techniques did require that times of measurement be equal
for each participant (Tabachnick & Fidell 2006), multilevel modeling is more flexible,
and can sufficiently deal with unequal times of measurement or even individually
varying times of measurement.
Finally, a situation can occur where all readings are missing on a certain variable,
for one certain year, for all cases. I have seen no mention in the literature of this
missingness structure, and for this reason will assume little is known about possible
bias it causes. Unfortunately, I have a single case of this missing data structure in my
dataset. The WDI did not (yet) have the 2004 per capita energy consumption data
1Software that is designed for the type of analysis I will be conducting, see section 4.2 on multilevel
modeling.
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available as of the summer of 2006 when my dataset was finalized for the analysis. I
considered excluding 2004 completely from the analysis as it is unknown what biases
this will cause. The missing data mechanism will treat this missing data as a series
ofcitem missing. I decided against deleting the whole 2004 wave as this one year on
a single variable is such a small segment of the complete dataset that I see no reason
to expect any possible bias to be substantial.
One of the more popular solutions for the missing data problem is imputation.
Imputation of missing values is an intuitively convenient response to the missing data
problem. Once the missing values are imputed the data can be analyzed as a complete
dataset. There are numerous imputation procedures available. The most commonly
used and most convenient procedure is mean imputation, where the mean of the vari-
able is imputed for cases of missing data. Unfortunately this procedure is also the
most harmful, as it decreases standard errors by driving down the univariate stan-
dard deviation of the variable. It modifies the distribution of the variable to overly
kurtotic, which, for parametric statistics, produces further violation of analytical as-
sumptions (Tabachnick & Fidell 2006). Another common imputation technique is the
imputation of a random draw from observed cases. This technique has the advan-
tage of introducing uncertainty in the dataset, therefore not producing overconfident
standard errors, but is highly inefficient and increases the probability of type II er-
rors. Furthermore, it is problematic incitem (or wave) missing cases in longitudinal
datasets, where variable continuity will be hurt. Yet another popular technique is
the imputation of the model-based expected value. This procedure is simple if data
is only missing on one variable, but becomes computationally intensive if the missing
values are scattered across numerous variables in the dataset. The procedure used to
estimate the predicted values is theciterative expectation-maximization (EM) algo-
rithm (Allison 2001). This is the procedure implemented in the missing data package
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of SPSS (Hill 1997). This procedure is highly efficient in producing unbiased param-
eter estimates, but it produces overly confident standard errors because by imputing
expected values we fail to consider any uncertainty for the missing values. On the
other hand, this procedure is useful if the researcher is interested in the most likely
values for missing cases (as long as no multivariate analysis is done with the completed
dataset).
The procedure that marries the advantages of producing unbiased estimates and
introducing the appropriate level of uncertainty in the modeling while being highly
efficient is multiple imputation (Schafer 1997). Multiple imputation (MI) requires the
researcher to impute missing values several times, creating M number of independent
complete datasets. Imputations will have different imputed values in all datasets, as
they are simulated values that consider both the expected value for the missingcitem
and the uncertainty. The imputation is a random draw from the plausible distribution
of thecitem. These M datasets have to be analyzed independently, with the same
analytical procedure and their results combined using a set of formulas which are
collectively known as Rubin’s rules (Little & Rubin 2002). Simulation studies have
shown that M ≥ 10 imputations produce sufficiently accurate results in longitudinal
models2 (Schafer 2001). This is the number of imputations I used.
While the combination of estimates from the M datasets are relatively simple, it
has to be done for every estimated parameter in the model. The software NORM
for Windows 2.03 has a built in engine that combines multiply imputed parameters
(Rubin 2004). This is what I used. A Perl script was written to take all parameters
from the SAS Proc Mixed output and convert it into a format understandable by
NORM3 (Schafer. 2000). The same script prepared an additional file to aid the
model comparisons. Script is included in appendix B.3.9
2M ≥ 5 is said to be enough for non-nested data (Rubin 2004).
3Script was written by Alex Clark. Thanks again.
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It is important to note that unlike with the imputation of plausible values, MI im-
putations are substantively meaningless. Oftentimes they are outside of the plausible
range of the variable. This tends to be problematic to people and the literature often
suggests that out of bounds variables be rounded off or re-imputed so they fall into the
plausible range4. I strongly disagree with such efforts, as they will only decrease the
variance of imputed variables, and produce overly confident standard errors. These
imputed values must be thought of as meaningless mathematical abstractions that
produce unbiased estimates in a multivariate analysis. Any interpretations of these
imputations independent of a multivariate analysis are incorrect (this includes evalu-
ation of the bounds).
There are several approaches to create multiple imputations. The most popular
approach is Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, that use Bayesian es-
timators like the Gibbs sampler, and the Metropolis-Hastings method to draw the
simulated imputations from the plausible (posterior) distribution (Casella & George
1992, Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller 1953, Hastings 1970). MI
is computationally a Bayesian approach, but it is a frequentist method by its philoso-
phy and logic as it uses non-informative priors, so prior knowledge does not influence
the estimated posterior distribution that simulated draws to fill the missing data are
from. Software written and distributed by Schafer uses this approach. This includes
NORM5, and its longitudinal extension PAN (Schafer. 2000, Schafer. 2005, Schafer
2001). Also, SAS has recently implemented multiple imputation based on the same
algorithm through Proc MI and Proc MIANALYZE (SAS 9.1.3 Intelligence Plat-
form User’s Guide 2005). While this approach is the most popular and the one I
attempted to use for my dissertation first, it was designed for census applications and
4Re-imputation is the default procedure in SAS Proc MI (SAS 9.1.3 Intelligence Platform User’s
Guide 2005). The Norm Documentation suggests rounding (Schafer. 2000)
5Which, beyond its ability to combine parameters using Rubin’s rules, can also produce imputa-
tions for non-nested datasets with missing data.
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does require a very large dataset. For the dataset at hand, the imputation model
never converged. After consulting one of the authors of the software (Dr. Yucel) we
concluded that it is not appropriate for this dataset due to small “sample” size.
Another approach to multiple imputation is based on another simulation tech-
nique where the plausible missing values are simulated through a bootstrap. Unlike
Bayesian approaches, bootstrapping carries the desirable properties of non-parametric
methods of being applicable with very small sample sizes (Efron 1994). It is impor-
tant to note that even though the imputation procedure is based on a bootstrap, it is
not completely non-parametric as the imputation is model based and the model has
parametric assumptions. Gary King has just released the second version of Amelia
which now can create imputations for nested and longitudinal datasets using a boot-
strap based method (Honaker & King 2006, Honaker, King, & Blackwell 2006). As
with all statistics procedures and software, Amelia II has its own disadvantages. It
has been released very recently, and the software is still under beta testing. Also, it
does not create imputations through a mixed (multilevel) model, but rather utilizes
a pooled time-series like regression. This has several disadvantages. Due to software
limitations and the degrees of freedom required to estimate pooled time series models,
we are limited to the inclusion of the intercept’s random effects6. The inclusion of
additional random effects in the imputation model would have been desirable. On
the other hand, the imputation model was expanded by including the leads and lags
of all observed variables.
Amelia II (and also PAN) can only impute time varying variables (Honaker &
King 2006, Schafer 2001). This is problematic as I do have a small number of non-
time varying covariates with some missing data, namely: average government wage,
and government interference in business. If I impute these variables as any other time
6For a detailed discussion of what mixed models and random effects are, see the following section
on multilevel modeling.
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varying covariate I will get different results for different years for the same country
where data was missing. This is problematic if I wish to continue using this data
as non-time varying. The solution I propose is to average across the 21 years. This
approach will surely suffer from the same handicaps as imputation of expected values,
and will produce overconfident standard errors. Therefore any P values concerning
these two variables will have to be interpreted with caution. Alternatively, I could
start treating the non-time varying covariates as time varying. But this would re-
quire me to make assumptions that I know are wrong: I would have to assume that
government wages and government interference in business did not change over the
21 year time span for the countries where this data was observed.
In a conversation, Dr. Schafer proposed a third alternative to dealing with miss-
ing non-time varying covariates. This approach would require the transformation of
the dataset into a non-time varying dataset by averaging across the 21 years for all
variables. Use a single level imputation model to produce the imputations. Then
use these imputed non-time varying values to produce the time varying imputations.
This approach has the danger of producing biased point estimates, as the averages
across the 21 years would not have sufficient missing data treatment. Since most of
my missing data is in the time varying components of the dataset I decided against
using this approach.
It is important to mention that there is another missing data treatment available
which produces unbiased parameter estimates and standard errors. This is the use
of the full information maximum likelihood estimator (Allison 2001). This approach
does not require imputation of data; rather it performs the estimation for all missing
data patterns like they were complete datasets. So for all cases that have observa-
tions for variable 1, 2, and 3, but not 4 it runs the estimations separate, then it does
this again for all cases that have observed values for variable 1, 2, and 4, and so on.
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Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is a common estimator in structural
equation models. It is possible to construct structural equation models that are com-
putationally equivalent to the longitudinal models I will use, but with the increasing
number of time varying covariates this gets increasingly messy and unmanageable.
Mplus now allows the estimation of multilevel models with missing data on all levels
using FIML (Muthe´n & Muthe´n 2006). Convergence is often a problem, as it was in
test runs I did with the dataset at hand. Furthermore, Mplus did not offer the flexi-
bility to estimate complex error covariance structures (like a first order autoregressive
model) in the multilevel modeling framework. These complex error covariance struc-
tures turned out to be necessary so the use of Mplus and FIML controls for missing
data was discarded. An additional disadvantage of FIML, as it is implemented for
multilevel models in Mplus, is its inability to incorporate auxiliary variables, making
the imputation model less efficient. Auxiliary variables are ones that are not included
in the analysis model, but included in the missing data model7. Finally, Schafer (in
the private conversation) suggested that multiple imputation is more robust to minor
violation of distributional assumptions then FIML. I plan to test this claim in future
studies but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
4.2 Multilevel Modeling
Multilevel modeling is an appropriate analytical procedure for nested or clustered
data structures (Raudenbush & Bryk 2001). One of the assumptions of regression
analysis is independent observations (Fox 1991). With nested data structures, where
observations are nested within a cluster (that are possibly nested within higher order
structures), regression analysis is in violation of the independent observations assump-
7For information on FIML estimation including auxiliary variables with non-nested data see
(Graham 2003)
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tion. Nested data structures are common in comparative politics. Two observations
within a country will be less independent than two observations from different coun-
tries. This is true for both international surveys and longitudinal political-economic
data. Two observations from the same country (for different years) are less indepen-
dent than observations from two different countries. We can conceptualize the nesting
as observations over time are nested within countries.
Pooled regression analysis traditionally ignores the nested nature of the data. This
is problematic as it produces positive autocorrelation that biases the standard errors
downward, making the P values overly confident (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Ap-
propriate controls do exist in the ordinary least squares regression framework (also
known as pooled times series analysis) (Sayrs 1989). The nesting can be controlled for
by the introduction of dummy variables. Unfortunately this approach is problematic
for several reasons. The ever-increasing number of dummy variable controls unneces-
sarily sucks up degrees of freedom, decreasing statistical power. Furthermore, dummy
variable approaches assume that predictor effects are identical across all higher level
units; they assume that the coefficients are identical for all countries. To estimate
random effects of time-varying covariates, interactions of the dummy controls for
nesting need to be interacted with the predictor, further increasing the number of es-
timated parameters and decreasing power. Multilevel modeling introduces additional
variance components (residual terms) in the model. These variance components allow
the coefficients of time varying covariates to vary across countries without the loss of
valuable degrees of freedom.
To clarify, I will use a simple example. This example will also help introduce
multilevel modeling notation. Two notations exist for drawing up multilevel models.
These are the multiple equation approach and the single equation approach. I will
use the multiple equation approach as I find it more intuitive from the substantive
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point of view.8 The most simple regression model I could draw is:
Yi = β0 + εi
where the response variable Y for each observed unit of i(=1,· · · ,N) is predicted only
by its intercept β0, and deviations from the intercept are captured by the residual
term εi. Let us extend this to a multilevel data structure:
Yij = β0j + εij
where j is the clustering. So for our case of cross-sectional time series data Yij is the
response variable for the year i for country j, β0j is the intercept for country j and
so on. Then we add:
β0j = γ00 + δ0j
where coefficient β0j is modified by a second level intercept γ00 that varies for each
country j by its second level residual δ0j. Basically, β0j is allowed to vary across
countries by δ0j.
To move this example to a higher level of complexity I will begin using a spe-
cific example. I will attempt to predict democratic performance Demij which is the
democratic performance of country j in year i by corruption levels Corij. This is
the relationship proposed by Warren (2004). This demonstrates how a time varying
covariate (also called level 1, over time, or longitudinal predictor) operates in a mul-
tilevel model. For now I will leave off the control variables as these sets of equations
can get messy very quickly. I will also introduce a non-time varying predictor (also
known as level 2 variables, or country level variables) of protestant colonial experience
8Statisticians usually beg to differ.
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(of country j) Protj.
Demij = β0j + β1jCorij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01Protj + δ0j
β1j = γ10 + δ1j
In this model γ00 can be interpreted as the baseline value of the intercept controlling
for all (we only have one) country level variables. Since our only country level variable
is dichotomous and dummy coded γ00 is interpreted as the β0j intercept for non-
protestant colonies. Country level variables can also be continuous in which case it
would be interpreted as the β0j value where the country level variable is zero. γ01
needs to be interpreted as the value that β0j is modified by for protestant colonies.
(If this was a continuous variable we would interpret it as: a unit increase in the
country level variable would be accompanied by this much change in β0j.) And
finally, δ0j represents the variance of β0j caused by the variation that exists between
the countries. It is not uncommon to see that this term is not significantly different
from zero. This is possible if the country level predictors explain all the country level
variation in β0j or if β0j does not vary across countries, in which case removing it
would yield a more parsimonious model.
Moving from the intercept to the impact of corruption on democratic performance
β1j we know that γ10 can be interpreted as the baseline level of β1j when all the
country level variables are zero (i.e. for non-protestant colonies). And finally, δ1j is the
leftover variance component of β1j attributable to differences in countries. These also
should be removed from the model if they are statistically zero. This little example
demonstrates well how the intercept and time varying coefficients are allowed to vary
across countries. And finally I should mention that εij is the variance not explained
by either longitudinal or country level variables.
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For many people it is easier to think about a multi-level model as a series of
independent regressions for each level 1 unit (for each country in our case). Each β for
each country is estimated individually. Then these are entered into another regression
model to estimate each γ. This is computationally inefficient due to loss of degrees of
freedom at every step of the process. Multilevel models use an estimation technique
that is a combination of maximum likelihood and Empirical Bayes. Through the
simultaneous computation of all components of interest, efficiency is insured. It is
important to note that though the estimator is Bayesian by nature, it uses completely
non-informative priors, so prior knowledge does not influence the results of the model.
When developing the substantive models of corruption and democratic perfor-
mance, I added an additional sophistication that allows me to disentangle longitudinal
and cross-sectional effects of level 1 predictors. While longitudinal and cross-sectional
variation of the dependent variable is separated by the nature of the modeling tech-
nique, the independent variables are not, unless special steps are taken to model these
with centering techniques.
Centering is not an uncommon technique with multilevel models, as it eases both
estimation and interpretation. Centering is basically the subtraction of the variable
mean from the individual value. This creates a meaningful baseline (0) value for
all variables. In multi-level models, level 1 variables can be centered around their
grand mean (the mean of all level 1 units regardless of which level 2 unit they are
in) or group mean (which is the variable mean within its own level 2 unit). In most
analysis, level 1 variables are grand mean centered pooling the variation of both levels
of analysis.
Group mean centering is used to flush out the variation between the level 2 units.
A value of 0 for a group mean centered variable will be the average score within the
level two unit. But the differences between the level 2 units get lost this way. While
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one level 2 unit can have generally high values, and another can have generally low
values, this difference will not be reflected if a variable is group mean centered. For
this reason it is important to avoid group mean centering if the differences between
level 2 units are meaningful.
The approach I will utilize is the use of group mean centered predictors, but since
the between country variation is very meaningful, I will control for these differences by
entering the group means of the Level 1 variable into the model as a level 2 variable.
Using the previous example this will appear the following way:
Demij = β0j + β1jCentCorij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01Protj + γ02AvgCorj + δ0j
β1j = γ10 + δ1j
Where β1j (or rather = γ10) is the within country effect of corruption on democratic
performance. In other words, this is interpreted so that corruption changes within
a country will change democratic performance. And γ02 can be interpreted as the
cross-sectional effects: countries with higher levels of corruption will tend to relate to
democratic performance by γ02. One is a within- and the other is a between-country
interpretation of the impact of the level 1 predictor on the dependent variable (Kreft,
de Leeuw, & Aiken 1995).
Why is this distinction important? In the multilevel modeling framework we can
easily fall into the traps of aggregation bias. If level 1 effects are strongly negative
and level 2 effects are strongly positive, these will cancel each other out unless they
are separated. In cases of longitudinal models this might seem unlikely, but tem-
poral effects will also need to be considered. For example, we would expect to see
that low-corruption countries are highly democratic, yielding a negative relationship
between corruption and democratic performance. But democratization might also
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be accompanied by a temporary surge of corruption. With the utilization of such
centering techniques in a 21 year panel dataset, we can separate short term (within
20 year) effects from long term effects (that emerged through the modern history of
countries).
Furthermore, another problem emerges with time series data. While multilevel
modeling allows for non-independent observations, the autocorrelation that is com-
mon with this type of data also needs to be controlled for. In multilevel models this
can be done by restricting the error covariance matrix to a first order autoregres-
sive structure. Fortunately, the need to control for autocorrelation is an empirical
question. Simple model comparison statistics can be used to determine the better
fitting model. Here I will use the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to determine
the best fitting model. The BIC is calculated from the log likelihood of the likelihood
function. It is known to be a discriminator that yields the best fitting model among
compared models (Schwarz 1978). Unlike the χ2 difference test, the BIC does not
require that the compared models be nested, which is convenient when comparing
models where the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of the predictors are pooled
versus separated.
I used SAS Proc Mixed to run these multilevel models (SAS 9.1.3 Intelligence Plat-
form User’s Guide 2005). SAS appeared to have the best capabilities to fit complex
error covariance structures like the autoregressive used in these models (Raudenbush
et al. 2004). HLM has several bugs that prevented me from estimating these mod-
els, and R’s nlme package does not estimate the hypothesis tests for random effects,
which was an inconvenience (R Development Core Team 2006, Pinheiro, Bates, De-
bRoy, , & Sarkar 2006, Pinheiro & Bates 2002). Mplus does not yet fit autoregressive
models in the multilevel modeling framework (Muthe´n & Muthe´n 2006). Reworking
these models into structural equations looked like more work than the mastery of a
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new software package. The SAS scripts used can be found in Appendix B.3. These
models were run for all 10 imputations, but were excluded from the appendix for
environmental reasons. I also did not include the models run for the sensitivity anal-
ysis. A competent researcher can easily modify the attached models to replicate all
the models run. In the case of SAS procedures I did not include the output as they
were not evaluated directly. The Perl script in Appendix B.3.9 was used to extract
the important information from the output. It produced files that served as input
for NORM, which combined the estimates from each imputation using Rubin’s rules
(Rubin 2004, Schafer. 2000).
4.3 Empirical Test of Causal Direction
The final analysis of the dissertation is an empirical exploration of causal direction.
Multilevel modeling just assumes causal direction from a theoretical point of view.
Therefore this final analysis calls for different methodology. The final analysis utilizes
a Granger causal path model as described in Finkel (1995). Path models allow for
simultaneous estimation of two variables’ impact on each other if the observed variable
is measured at several time points. Basically, it is the simultaneous estimation of X’s
impact at time 1 on Y at time 2 (after controlling for Y’s own impact at the time
1) and Y’s impact at time 1 on X at time 2, etc. The relationships are highlighted
with a traditional regression coefficient and its confidence intervals. One significant
relationship suggests causal direction. Two significant relationships suggest that both
variables affect each other (See Figure 4.1).
There are several problems with this analytical procedure. First, it assumes that
the causal impact is actualized within the time that elapses between the two times
of measurements. Since we have no theoretical expectations for how long it takes
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Figure 4.1: Simple Cross-Path Model with One Year Lags
from variable X to have an impact on variable Y, multiple time lag structures were
analyzed. This is possible since the amount of available data includes 21 annual
readings starting in 1984. 10 different lag structures are tested: immediate impact, 1
year, 2 year to 9 year lags. This allows for the detection of causation that only shows
its effects after several years. For an illustration of the 2 year lag model (see Figure
4.2).
Another limitation of the models is in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is the assumption of no
spurious correlations between variables. The traditional way of controlling for this is
striving for a full specification of the model that includes all predictors. For cross-lag
models this approach is problematic, as any time varying predictors would exponen-
tially increase the number of estimated parameters. Especially since path modeling
requires specification of all possible relationships between variables, not just the re-
lationship between the dependent and independent variables. To do this, we would
have a model that has substantially more estimated parameters than cases studied.
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Figure 4.2: Simple Cross-Path Model with Two Year Lags
While this is theoretically not problematic as path analysis uses the number of unique
information in the covariance matrix, and not the number of cases for degrees of free-
dom. On the other hand the maximum likelihood estimator used here needs the large
number of cases to be able to estimate the model. We are already in violation of
sample size rules of thumb by only having 186 cases. This does not mean the models
will have biased estimates; it only means theciterative processes used to estimate the
model have a higher probability of never ending (converging) or ending at nonsen-
sical estimates (also called local solutions). In preliminary analysis, we attempted
to control for common independent variables, but it quickly became apparent that a
different control would be necessary. (Similarly, simultaneous estimation of different
lag structures was also attempted without success.)
Controlling for possible predictors was solved by Finkel’s recommendation to in-
clude a latent factor to extract common variance attributed to any possible common
underlying causal source (see Figure 4.3). This approach nullifies the autocorrelation
between the studied time series data reducing the inflated fit parameters, also mini-
mizing the effects of spurious correlations. Using a latent factor to extract common
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variance has its limitations, as it assumes that the common source of correlation is
non-time varying, but it greatly reduces the possibility of spurious correlation bias.
Figure 4.3: Complex Cross-Path Model with Autocorrelation Latent Factor
Path modeling with time series data suffers from an additional problem called
empirical underidentification. The problem occurs when the correlation between two
variables of the model is -1, 0, 1 or a number very close to -1, 0 and 1. These
values are not useful unique information in the covariance matrix, thus sucking up
degree of freedom and decreasing the number of possible estimated parameters. Due
to the autoregressive nature of time series data, correlation between back to back
readings on any variables is often 1 or very close to 1. To overcome this problem
I decreased the number of estimated parameters by equating causal paths across
time. For example X1’s impact on Y2 was equated to X2’s impact on Y3 and etc.,
substantially decreasing the number of estimated parameters. This assumption is
reasonable since the authors have no theoretical reason to believe that the relationship
between X and Y would change substantially over time. All causal analyses were done
in Mplus version 4.1 (Muthe´n & Muthe´n 2006).
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4.4 A Note on Model Fit
Scholars who for the most part use ordinary least squares (OLS) approaches often look
at maximum likelihood models (like multilevel or structural equation models) with
great suspicion. This is usually driven by the lack of clear and easily interpretable
model fit statistics, like the F Test and the R2 used in OLS. For example, for a
structural equation model with multiple dependent variables R2 becomes practically
meaningless. We would need an R2 for each dependent variable. Multilevel model-
ers have suggested numerous pseudo-R2 approaches to estimate variance explained.
Unfortunately the random slope parameters complicated the development of such a
measure. It is possible, for example, to include a new variable and get a reduction
of variance explained using these pseudo measures9 For this reason I decided to stay
away from reporting pseudo-R2s.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a direct transformation of the like-
lihood function and is an unbiased discriminator between competing models. With
the BIC we can tell which one of competing models show the best fit. The lower
the BIC, the better the fit. Unfortunately the difference in BIC is a meaningless
number, it does not have a neat substantive interpretation like the R2 (% of variance
explained). For multilevel models it is customary to include a baseline model (with
no predictors) and compare subsequent models to that. If the included variables do
not make the model fit better, the BIC of the baseline model will be lower suggesting
that the selected predictors produce a model that fits worst then a model that does
not include these predictors. In my analysis I will report the BIC of the baseline and
all competing models.
Structural equation modelers were highly fruitful in their development of numerous
approaches to determine fit. Dumpsters could be filled up with articles that proceeded
9For an extensive discussion of the pseudo-R2 controversy, see Hox (2002)
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to test the effectiveness of these model fit statistics10 Generally speaking, depending
on the type and complexity of the structural equation model used some fit statistics
perform better then others. The causal model utilized in my analysis is a very special
case of a structural equation model. No research exist on the effectiveness of the
existing fit statistics using this model. For this reason, and for consistency I decided
to only report the BIC of the competing causal models. In this case a baseline model
is not available, since the concept of a baseline for a causal model is meaningless. But
different lag structures can be compared to each other.




To make sure the data meets distributional assumptions, I did extensive data ex-
ploration. Variables that were in violation of the assumption of normal distribution
were transformed1. How normal is normal is always a judgment call, and no clear
prescriptions exist for cutoffs. I established the rules that values under 2 for the
absolute value of skewness and values under 7 for the absolute value of kurtosis were
acceptable.2 Following these rules several variables were in need of transformation:
GDP, per capita energy consumption, fuel endowments, mineral endowments, percent
protestants, aid, official development assistance (ODA), and foreign direct investment
(FDI). All these variables were (natural) logged. Due to measurement artifacts of aid,
1Instead of these transformations it is common to use robust standard errors in multilevel and
structural equation models. Such a treatment was not available for the imputation model that
also rests on similar parametric assumptions. Furthermore Kenward and Molenberghs has shown
that it is necessary to use the observed information matrix when missing data is present unless
MCAR assumption holds (Kenward & Molenberghs 1998). Robust standard errors use the estimated
information matrix, therefore are not unbiased in this analysis where the assumption of the missing
data mechanism is only MAR. There is a debate concerning the amount of bias in robust standard
errors. Mplus by default estimates models with robust standard errors even if missing data is present.
Enders has shown that bias is negligible in a simple structural equation model (2001). Since no such
tests are available for multilevel models and the causal structural equation model is sufficiently
complex, I decided to use and report regular standard errors.
2These rules were suggested by Dr. Craig Enders in his structural equations modeling and longi-
tudinal multilevel modeling seminars.
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Fuel Production 0.13 -0.29
(1906) (2181)




Energy Consumption -0.54 0.39
(2104) (2298)
Raw Material Exports -0.26 0.31
(1959) (2379)
Sample Sizes are (in Parentheses)
Bolded Are Not Statistically Significant.
ODA and FDI some countries had negative values. These were truncated to 0. To
avoid non-computable results (logged zeros) 0.5 was added to fuel endowments, min-
eral endowments and the truncated variables prior to log transformation 3.
In addition to the logged values, government wage suffered from two extreme
outliers4 for Belarus and Tonga. These values were dropped and treated as missing,
as it is almost certain that they were errors in the WDI database.
Table 5.1 provides the raw Pearson’s correlations between the post transformation
predictors and the response variables. It is important to note that these correlations
are blind to the nested nature of the data structure and were analyzed as if all
observations were independent of each other.
3Exploration and data work was done mostly in SPSS Version 13 (SPS 2004). My SPSS scripts
are available in the Appendix.
478.1 and 936.2. The mean of government wage was 2.731 with a standard deviation of 2.388
after the outliers were removed
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Table 5.2: Variance Decompositions
Within Between
Variable Variance T-scores Variance T-scores Within% Between%
Corruption 0.527 11.64 1.366 8.42 27.8% 72.2%
Freedomhouse 2.739 8.63 13.296 15.67 17.1% 82.9%
Ethnic Tension 0.664 11.16 1.503 9.39 30.6% 69.4%
GDP 0.035 6.45 2.335 13.50 1.5% 98.5%
Imports 89.728 8.02 451.191 8.60 16.6% 83.4%
Fuel Production 0.389 6.27 2.556 12.35 13.2% 86.8%
Mineral Production 0.175 6.18 1.61 10.24 9.8% 90.2%
Stability 4.48 19.63 0.917 5.96 83.0% 17.0%
Energy Consumption 0.023 7.41 1.13 11.02 2.0% 98.0%
Raw Material Exports 0.008 4.68 0.235 1.30 3.3% 96.7%
Bolded Are Not Statistically Significant.
Table 5.2 is a variance decomposition between the levels of analysis 5. Simply
speaking, it separates the variance of each variable to within country longitudinal
variance and between country cross-sectional variance6. To do this I ran a simple
multilevel model for each variable. In each model the variable of interest was the
dependent variable, and no predictors were added.
DVij = β0j + εij
β0j = γ00 + δ0j
Appendix C2.1 has an example Mplus script for this model. This is also known as
the baseline model when it is run on the dependent variable of interest. Here I am




to calculate the relative within country variance and
δ0j
εij+δ0j
to calculate the relative between country variance.
Evaluating Table 5.2 we can see that most of the variance is between the countries
for almost all variables. But there is significant within country variance to explain.
5The decomposition of variance was done in Mplus Version 4.1 (Muthe´n & Muthe´n 2006). My
Mplus scripts are available in the Appendix.
6Due to the univariate nature of the variance decomposition listwise deletion was used to estimate
the proportion of the longitudinal and cross-sectional variances.
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This is what past studies did not attempt to do. It is interesting to note that the
vast majority of the raw material exports variance (96.7%) is between the countries,
but this between country variance is not significant. I decided to leave this variable
in the model of democratic performance unmodified. Also it is interesting that unlike
with any of the other variables, the majority of the variance for stability is within the
countries.
The next step in the exploration of the data is the evaluation of the response
variables’ trends over time. Figure 5.1 shows linearized trends in corruption over
time for countries where observations at all time points were available7 Though time
is not a predictor in the model, this chart shows that there is very significant variation
between countries both in the direction and the starting point of their corruption
levels. Figures 5.2 to 5.5 show the spline trend lines over time for all countries where
corruption scores were available.
Figure 5.1: Corruption Trajectories from 1984 to 2004
7the figures in this chapter were produced in SPSS Version 13 (SPS 2004). My scripts are available
in the Appendix.
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Figure 5.2: Corruption Ratings from 1984 to 2004, A-C
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Figure 5.3: Corruption Ratings from 1984 to 2004, C-L
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Figure 5.4: Corruption Ratings from 1984 to 2004, L-S
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Figure 5.5: Corruption Ratings from 1984 to 2004, S-Z
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Similarly to the trends in corruption, Figure 5.6 shows the linearized trends of
democratic performance over time for all countries where data was available for all
time points. Once again, this graph shows that there is a lot of variation between
countries. Generally speaking, the chart shows an increase in democratic performance.
This is to be expected since the time period in question is when the bulk of the
third wave democratizations took place (Huntington 1991). But many countries also
experienced slight to moderate decreases in their democratic levels. Once again it
is important to note that time is not a predictor of democratic performance in the
data. Figures 5.7 to 5.11 show spline trends of democratic performance over time for
all countries in the dataset.
Figure 5.6: Democratic Performance Trajectories from 1984 to 2004
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Figure 5.7: Democratic Performance from 1984 to 2004, A-C
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Figure 5.8: Democratic Performance from 1984 to 2004, C-G
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Figure 5.9: Democratic Performance from 1984 to 2004, H=M
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Figure 5.10: Democratic Performance from 1984 to 2004, M-S
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Figure 5.11: Democratic Performance from 1984 to 2004, S-Z
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The final set of figures explore the main question of this dissertation, the relation-
ship between corruption and democratic performance. Figure 5.12 pools the linear
relationships. This chart shows high variation in the trends, justifying the use of a
multilevel model. Overall a slight negative trend is apparent from this graph, but this
might only be true for states that are highly corrupt. It is important to note that
this exploration excludes all of the controls already cited as correlates of corruption
or democratic performance.
Figure 5.12: Pooled Relationships Between Corruption and Democratic Performance.
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Figures 5.13 to 5.16 show the relationship between corruption and democratic
performance for all countries where this data was available. In this case a linear
regression line was more appropriate than a spline line, so the individual country
charts show regression lines instead of splines.
Figure 5.13: Relationship Between Corruption and Democratic Performance, A-C
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Figure 5.14: Relationship Between Corruption and Democratic Performance, C-L
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Figure 5.15: Relationship Between Corruption and Democratic Performance, L-S
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Figure 5.16: Relationship Between Corruption and Democratic Performance, S-Z
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Chapter 6
The Imputation of Missing Data
The method of imputation was already discussed in the methods section. The model
used to produce the imputations included all variables in the two models (model of
corruption, and model of democratic performance) and the additional variables of aid,
foreign direct investment, and official development assistance. It is important to use
these additional variables as the imputation model should be more broad than the
analysis model (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve 2001, Schafer 1997, Allison 2001).
In fact, the imputation model does not have to be theoretical. For this reason I also
included leads and lags of all variables in the model.
Amelia II is not the best documented software at this point in time. This is
probably because it is still in the beta testing phase. From what I have gathered,
the imputation model is not a mixed (multilevel) random effects model. Amelia does
not allow the inclusion of random effects for any of the variables but time and its
polynomials. When I tried to include time with its random effect I got an error mes-
sage informing me of insufficient sample size, further suggesting that the imputation
model is a pooled time series and not a mixed random effects model. I ended up not
including time in the imputation model. This is reasonable as time is not part of
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either of the analyses. In psychology, the time spent in counseling, in school, etc. are
of substantive interest, making time a very important predictor. In comparative po-
litical economy, an outcome claiming that corruption goes away if we just wait long
enough, (or countries will democratize if we wait it out) would be a laughable out-
come (while I am fairly certain that time would turn out to be a significant variable,
as it is in most time series data).
Figure 6.1: Convergence Test of 300 Imputation Models.
To test imputation model convergence, I ran 300 imputations. Amelia II has im-
pressive graphic facilities for creating plots to test if models converge to an actual
outcome. In the first diagnostic plot, it produces a two dimensional representation
of the multi-dimensional likelihood function. It uses random starting values as it
integrates across the multivariate distribution to find a global minimum. If the al-
gorithm converges to the same outcome with all the starting values, the imputations
can be considered reliable. Figure 6.1 shows that all 300 models converged to the
same outcome, making local minimum solutions highly unlikely.
Beyond the overall model diagnostic, Amelia II also offers variable by variable
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diagnostics. The following set of figures presents the probability plots of observed,
and the imputed values. These charts give a good visual indication of where the
imputations fell within the distribution of observed values. Figures 6.2 to 6.12 present
the observed and imputed probability distributions for each variable where imputation
was needed.
It is worth mentioning the wavy pattern of the corruption and ethnic tension
charts. If the waves were smoothed out, these variables would have a normal distri-
bution. The waves emerged as the agency that compiled these two variables has a
clear rounding bias. They do not shy away from giving fraction scores, but whole
number values are much more common. This is why the waves emerged. The high
points of the waves are round numbers and numbers in between are fractions (which
they are less likely to give).
Figure 6.2: Observed and Imputed Values of Corruption
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Figure 6.3: Observed and Imputed Values of Ethnic Tensions
Figure 6.4: Observed and Imputed Values of GDP
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Figure 6.5: Observed and Imputed Values of Trade Openness
Figure 6.6: Observed and Imputed Values of Fuel Export
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Figure 6.7: Observed and Imputed Values of Mineral Export
Figure 6.8: Observed and Imputed Values of Stability
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Figure 6.9: Observed and Imputed Values of Government Intervention
Figure 6.10: Observed and Imputed Values of Government Wage
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Figure 6.11: Observed and Imputed Values of Development
Figure 6.12: Observed and Imputed Values of World Position
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Beyond the probability plots, Amelia offers another set of diagnostics for each
variable of the imputation model. These plots are a little more difficult to interpret.
What Amelia does is delete an observed value and produce test imputations for it.
For each value in the dataset Amelia does this several hundred times1. Amelia then
plots the imputed values with their confidence intervals in relation to the deleted
observed value. The diagonal line in these figures shows where the imputed variable
should be if it is equal to the observed variable that was deleted. Figures 6.13 to 6.23
show these test imputation plots.
Figure 6.13: Test Imputations of Corruption
1This takes only a few seconds which highlighting the efficiency of this imputation procedure.
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Figure 6.14: Test Imputations of Ethnic Tensions
Figure 6.15: Test Imputations of GDP
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Figure 6.16: Test Imputations of Trade Openness
Figure 6.17: Test Imputations of Fuel Export
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Figure 6.18: Test Imputations of Mineral Export
Figure 6.19: Test Imputations of Stability
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Figure 6.20: Test Imputations of Government Intervention
Figure 6.21: Test Imputations of Government Wage
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Figure 6.22: Test Imputations of Development
Figure 6.23: Test Imputations of World Position
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For GDP the plot of test imputations almost perfectly follows the diagonal line.
For a couple of variables, the extremes (mainly on the high end) tend to deviate
more towards a horizontal line. This can best be seen in the world position plot.
Development also follows the diagonal nicely, but two clusters of observations deviate
from it. One of these is on the high end of the observed spectrum, while the other
(to a lesser extent) is on the low end.
The variables that might raise some cause for concern are the variables that heavily
deviate towards the center near the high end of the spectrum of values (eg. Trade
Openness, Government Intervention and Government Wage) or the rest that show a
near horizontal line. These results should not be too alarming. The 90% confidence
intervals usually touch the diagonal line. Also the most significant deviations occur
in the extremes.
What we see on these imputation test plots (and possibly to a lesser extent on the
probability distributions of imputed values) is that the uncertainty of missing data is
underestimated in the imputation model. (For the country level variables with missing
data, this is to be expected.) In the methodology section, I explained why plausible
values are not good to impute, as they decrease standard errors, making results overly
confident. Multiple imputation should be able to model both the expected value and
the uncertainty. According to these diagnostics, the uncertainty is underestimated,
at least for some variables. The results will still be more precise than we would expect
from other imputation techniques. Interpretation of results calls for some caution as




7.1 Causes of Corruption
To estimate the model of corruption, a multilevel model was drawn with the following
predictors:








• Between Country Predictors
- Percent Protestants
- British Colonial Past
- Common Law
- Federalist Government Structure
- Government Intervention
- Government Wages
I report the results from four different models. Two models pool the cross-sectional
and longitudinal effects of the longitudinal predictors, the other two separate them.
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One of each constrains the error covariance matrix to be first order autoregressive
(AR1) while the other estimates an unstructured error covariance matrix. As part of
the sensitivity analysis several models with different number of random effects were
considered.
My country level sample size is 186 countries. This considered a low sample size
for multilevel models. Also, multilevel modeling assumes infinite populations. The
186 countries in my dataset is very close to a population but, to date, no adjustment
techniques exist for the finite population artificially lowering power1 For this reason
the number of estimated parameters is an important consideration in my model de-
velopment. Every additional parameter uses valuable degrees of freedom. While it
is common to see lots of interaction effects in multilevel models my models excluded
all interactions due to lack of theoretical justifications for their inclusion. (None
of the other past studies proposed interactions.)2 Insignificant random effects were
also excluded sequentially and the best fitting model was selected using the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) averaged across the imputations.
The BIC is the most unbiased method to discriminate between alternative models
but its unbiasedness did not receive much attention in the multiple imputation frame-
work. Software that combines multiply imputed results automatically (like Mplus)
reports the average BIC as model fit statistics for multiply imputed models (Muthe´n
& Muthe´n 2006). I decided to follow this practice. Often the differences between BIC
statistics were minimal conditioned on the inclusion or removal of a random effect.
1Dr. Jim Bovaird and I have discussed the possibility of developing a finite population adjustment
method for multilevel modeling, but it will be a long time before such research yields results.
2Radenbush and Bryk advocates the use of “parallel” models that include all cross-level interac-
tions (2001). I find this practice to be exploratory, atheoretical and unscientific (though I have to
admit, that unlike the single equation form, the multiple equation representation of parallel models
are quite pretty). Inclusion of interactions should always be theory based. They should be included
sparingly as the additional estimated components diminish the power of the model. (This is espe-
cially important with low sample sizes). When considering their inclusion, all types of interactions
need to be considered equally. Interactions between level 1 and level 2 variables shall not be favored
over interactions between two level 1 or two level 2 variables.
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The average BICs of the competing models are presented in table 7.1.
Random effects were excluded sequentially. This table also includes the number
of converged models. Non-convergence is usually a sign of too many estimated ran-
dom effects. Due to the use of multiple imputations all models had to be run ten
times. This feature of multiply imputed data provided us with an ad-hoc measure
of misspecification. If none of the ten models converged, the model was obviously
misspecified. If at least one of the models converged, its results provided good guid-
ance as to what parameters might be causing the problem, and were excluded. If
all the models converged, the significance of the random effects (though somewhat
unreliable) provided guidance as to possible additional parameters to exclude. Final
exclusion decisions were not based on the significance test of random effects, they
were based on BIC model fit. If all ten imputations converged, the results of that
model was included in the sensitivity analysis. If less than ten models converged,
they were excluded due to high degrees of misspecification.
Since the differences between these models were minimal, I decided to report the
results from the best fitting model, but I engaged in extensive sensitivity analysis
and considered the results of alternative models. Generally speaking the results did
not change by much across these alternative models considered. All differences in
significance levels are presented in table 7.2.
Generally speaking, it is clear that the autoregressive restriction is needed. Inter-
estingly the BIC for the full model that separates the longitudinal and cross-sectional
predictor effects is not smaller than the pooled model. It is in fact a little larger, but
they are so close to each other that it is not sufficient for discrimination between the
two models. Furthermore, there is concern that the BIC is not even appropriate if the
data for the two models are centered differently. So far no research is available on this
question. Both models need to be considered. One provides us with more information
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Table 7.1: Model Comparisons for Corruption
Average BIC converged
Baseline Model 9284.9 10
Pooled Model with 8 random effects without AR1 - 0
Pooled Model with 7 random effects without AR1 (no Democratic Performance) - 0
Pooled Model with 7 random effects without AR1 (no GDP) - 0
Pooled Model with 6 random effects without AR1 8632.6 10
Pooled Model with 5 random effects without AR1 (No Mineral Export) 8615.7 10
Pooled Model with 4 random effects without AR1 (No Fuel Export) 8599 10
Pooled Model with 3 random effects without AR1 (No Trade Openness) 8612 10
Pooled Model with 8 random effects - 0
Pooled Model with 7 random effects (no Democratic Performance) - 0
Pooled Model with 7 random effects (no GDP) - 0
Pooled Model with 6 random effects 7896.4 10
Pooled Model with 5 random effects (no Trade Openness) 7857.6 10
Pooled Model with 4 random effects (no Mineral Export) 7850.9 10
Pooled Model with 3 random effects (no Fuel Export) 7848.8 10
Pooled Model with 4 random effects (estimate Trade Openness) 7868.2 9
Full Model with 8 random effects without AR1 - 0
Full Model with 7 random effects without AR1 (no Democratic Performance) 8459.7 2
Full Model with 7 random effects without AR1 (no GDP) 8586.2 6
Full Model with 6 random effects without AR1 8584.7 10
Full Model with 5 random effects without AR1 (no Mineral Export) 8568.7 10
Full Model with 4 random effects without AR1 (No Fuel Export) 8552.9 10
Full Model with 3 random effects without AR1 (No Trade Openness) 8587.6 10
Full Model with 8 random effects - 0
Full Model with 7 random effects (no Democratic Performance) - 0
Full Model with 7 random effects (no GDP) - 0
Full Model with 6 random effects 7907.4 9
Full Model with 5 random effects (no Trade Openness) 7856.9 10
Full Model with 4 random effects (no Mineral Export) 7851.1 10
Full Model with 3 random effects (no Fuel Export) 7849.5 10
Full Model with 4 random effects (estimate Trade Openness) 7862.7 10
Italics: Not all imputations converged. Results ignored.
Bold: Best fitting model coefficients reported
(For sensitivity analysis, significance of best fitting models is compared to all other converged models)
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Table 7.2: Model Results for Corruption
Pooled w/o AR1 Full w/o AR1 Pooled w/ AR1 Full w/ AR1
BIC 8599 8552.9 7848.8 7849.5
VAR(Intercept) 0.413*** 0.394*** 0.268*** 0.290***
COV(Ethnic Tension,Intercept) -0.003 0.027 -0.015 0.016
VAR(Ethnic Tension) 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.043*** 0.038***
COV(Stability,Intercept) -0.024** -0.020** -0.017* -0.016*
COV(Stability,Ethnic Tension) 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003
VAR(Stability) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.011***
COV(Trade Openness,Intercept) -0.003* -0.002
COV(Trade Openness,Ethnic Tensions) -0.001 -0.001
COV(Trade Openness,Stability) -0.0004 -0.001
VAR(Trade Openness) 0.0002*** 0.001***
AR1 0.589*** 0.582***
Residual 0.471*** 0.459*** 0.686*** 0.675***
Intercept 2.908*** 2.843*** 2.907*** 2.862
% Protestants -0.074*** -0.064** -0.075*** -0.063**
British Colonial Past 0.153 0.229’ 0.269* 0.290**
Common Law -0.184 0.021 -0.180 -0.044
Federalist -0.136 -0.018 -0.162 -0.047
Government Intervention 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
Government Wages 0.085*** 0.019 0.058** 0.023
Pooled Effect of Dem. Perf. -0.038*** -0.039***
Longitudinal Effect of Dem. Perf. -0.027**+++ -0.017
Cross-sectional Effect of Dem. Perf. -0.076*** -0.078***
Pooled Effect of Ethnic Tension 0.178*** 0.133***
Longitudinal Effect of Ethnic Tension 0.181*** 0.130***
Cross-sectional Effect of Ethnic Tension 0.032 0.019
Pooled Effect of GDP -0.128**++ -0.206***
Longitudinal Effect of GDP 0.107 -0.011
Cross-sectional Effect of GDP -0.236*** -0.234***
Pooled Effect of Trade Openness 0.006*** 0.003*+
Longitudinal Effect of Trade Openness 0.008*** 0.004*+
Cross-sectional Effect of Trade Openness 0.005’ 0.005’
Pooled Effect of Fuel Export 0.027 0.014
Longitudinal Effect of Fuel Export 0.028 0.012
Cross-sectional Effect of Fuel Export 0.056 0.063
Pooled Effect of Mineral Export -0.033 -0.031*!
Longitudinal Effect of Mineral Export -0.036 -0.030’ !
Cross-sectional Effect of Mineral Export -0.069 -0.075
Pooled Effect of Stability 0.051*** 0.014
Longitudinal Effect of Stability 0.046*** 0.015
Cross-sectional Effect of Stability -0.194*** -0.203***
’< .10, *< .10, **< .05, ***< .01
+ Significant at the .05 level in models with more random effects
++ Significant at .01 in 3 random effect model.
+++ Significant at .10 in 3 random effect model.
! Not significant when its own random effects are included
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as to what is driving the relationships, cross-sectional effects or longitudinal effects,
the other is clearly more parsimonious.
Starting with the cross-sectional variables, the most interesting finding is probably
the direction of coefficient for British colonial past. Most past research found that
British colonies tend to be less corrupt. Not according to my findings. This is prob-
ably a perfect example of how sample selection can bias findings. Most past studies
either focused on developing countries, or countries with available data (removing
numerous countries from the model). In the former case it is possible that British
colonies are less corrupt than other colonies and highly underdeveloped non-colonies.
But in the grand scheme of things, when all countries are considered, British colonies
are more corrupt than non-British colonies. In the latter sample selection case where
countries were tossed due to insufficient information, we need to consider which coun-
tries have the most accessible information reporting. The most open countries usually
provide information that researchers can use. If you consider highly developed coun-
tries that were also past British settler colonies like the United States, New Zealand,
Canada, and Australia as British colonies, and excludes half of the Middle Wast, of
course you will find that British Colonies are less corrupt. Available information and
corruption are highly correlated, and this produces biased results.
It is quite possible that a full sample model that only includes British colonial past
is underspecified and should include other colonial experiences. Here, the purpose of
my study was to replicate past findings with a more complete and also longitudinal
dataset. But as I rework this chapter into a publication, I plan to develop my own
theoretical model of corruption. In this I plan to extensively explore the impact
of colonial experience on corruption. Much like I did in the next chapter, I plan
to separate out non-colonies from colonies and then look at subdivisions of those
colonies. When I developed the model of democratic performance, I used protestant
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and catholic colonies. In the case of the corruption model I plan to stick to the
British colonies as it is such an important and consistent finding in the corruption
literature. I plan to supplement British colonial experience with comparisons to non-
British colonies and possibly look at settler colonies (US, Canada) versus resource
colonies (Middle Eastern and African ex-Colonies).
Secondly, as hypothesized, government intervention is a strong predictor of cor-
ruption with a positive sign. The more intrusive a government is, the more corrupt it
will be. As if government clout creates an environment where corruption will occur.
It is a shame that the World Bank only started to collect this data in 2003 and that
ICRG does not provide measures of government intervention. This variable should be
time varying, but I was forced to operationalize it as a non-time varying variable due
to lack of data. If findings hold longitudinally the implications is clear. When bat-
tling corruption the goal should be cutting red tape. But this finding has even deeper
consequences. The European Union has often been criticized for creating unnecessary
red tape. It is considered one of the largest bureaucracies, with more rules and reg-
ulations than most feel necessary. Will the takeover of European Union institutions
increase corruption in Europe? It is a possibility which Europe needs to consider, in
light of the cited findings. But I should remind the reader that these results should
be taken with a grain of salt. The missing data treatment did not allow me to deal
with missing data appropriately, and therefore these results are overconfident, and it
is hard to tell the extent of standard error deflation but since the results are highly
significant I assume the relationship to be there.
Finally the pooled predictor effect models both showed a significant relationship
between government wage and corruption. While these findings are somewhat un-
certain as they are conditioned on model specification the sign of the relationship
is alarming. Intuitively we consider corruption as a supplement of income for gov-
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ernment officials. Therefore it only makes sense that well paid government officials
will not engage in corrupt activities. These findings show the opposite. The more a
government employees get paid, the more corrupt they will be. Montinola and Jack-
man argued that underpaid government officials will be more corrupt (2002), though
I found little empirical verification of these claims in their study. Current findings
suggest that Montinola and Jackman should reconsider their claims.
These findings, again, need to be taken with a grain of salt. First of all, they
are overconfident due to the missing data treatment. As the results were only sig-
nificant at the .05 level, they might not be significant at all once the missingness
uncertainty is considered. Findings are also highly prone to aggregation bias. The
variable we included was an average pay variable. It is entirely possible that the
pay discrepancy between low level officials and higher level government employees is
high. Our corruption score also does not distinguish between the levels of government
where corruption is taking place. One thing is certain: The cited findings bring into
question the theory that we can fight corruption by paying government officials well.
Maybe people are more greedy than we initially expected.
Turning to the longitudinal variables. There is an inverse relationship between
democratic performance and corruption. This is predominantly driven by the cross-
sectional differences, but there is some indication that longitudinal forces might also
be at play. Unfortunately this is only apparent in the model without AR1. AR1
models have much lower power and require higher sample size. Lack of control for
the autoregressive nature of the data is known to produce overconfident results. So we
really do not know if longitudinal effects are picked up because of overconfident results
or the added power of the unstructured error covariance matrix. Both possibilities
need to be considered.
A very interesting finding is that the significant effects of ethnic tensions are
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predominantly driven by longitudinal effects. This suggests that stable ethnic tensions
might not be as problematic as increases of ethnic tensions, etc. Preventing escalation
of ethnic problems should be on the agenda of fighters of corruption.
As past studies suggested, GDP is inversely related to corruption. This is driven
by cross-sectional differences.
Also an interesting finding is that trade openness is directly related to corruption.
These effects are driven by longitudinal effects. This could be due to liberalization
of trade policies. When trade is liberalized, this is accompanied by a strong influx of
capital. Naturally this means more kickbacks, etc. Normally we would expect these
liberalization effects to go away with time which would imply that the cross-sectional
effects should have a negative sign. But in this case they do not appear to do that. In
fact the cross-sectional effects also approach significance. Other possible explanations
include possible mediation and moderation effects. These findings point to the need
to conduct a structural analysis of the relationship between these variables.
A very interesting finding that went against all expectations is the lack of signifi-
cant effect of oil on corruption. Apparently once developed oil exporters (like Norway)
are included in the dataset, the impact of oil on corruption goes away. The model
picked up a moderate negative impact of mineral exports which goes against Treis-
man’s findings. While these effects are highly uncertain, they verify my suspicions
that fuel exports and mineral exports should be treated separately.
And finally, the effects of stability show the interesting pattern that suggests that
the pooled effects suffer from aggregation bias. In the pooled model (with) AR1
stability has a slight positive and non-significant effect on corruption. But once
the longitudinal and cross-sectional effects are separated, a significant negative cross-
sectional effect becomes apparent. In the model without controls for AR1, this pattern
is much more apparent, but has to be interpreted with caution for reasons already
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cited above. None the less, the pooled effect shows a significant positive relationship
between stability and corruption, but when separated only the longitudinal effect
remains a positive significant effect. The cross-sectional effect is negative.
What does this mean? It means that more stable countries have less corruption.
But during stabilization (or destabilization) of a country, corruption closely follows
the transitional patterns, showing a direct relationship. Stabilization is accompanied
by increases in corruption. This is only possible if the immediate effects are different
from the long term effects. Figure 7.1 graphically shows how this kind of relationship
can emerge. But once again, it is important to interpret the longitudinal effect with
caution, as it did not show up significantly in the best fitting model, only in the model
where the autoregressive nature of the data was not controlled for. But the directions
of the coefficients were unchanged, so it is entirely possible that if we had access to a
longer time series, we could increase our power to reach significance.
Figure 7.1: Changes in Corruption Levels After Stabilization
Random effects are more difficult to interpret in multilevel models. While mod-
eling random effects is important, random effects often do not have substantive in-
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terpretations. Also, it is rare to find studies where random effects are included and
excluded based on theoretically solid frameworks.
It is important to model random effects, as they relax some stringent assumptions
of regression modeling. For example, if we do not include the random effects of stabil-
ity in our model we assume that stability will have the same impact on corruption for
all countries. While this might be a reasonable assumption for any given longitudinal
variable, no theoretical framework or past finding is available to guide our theories.
In fact this is an assumption past studies made. By using multilevel modeling, I relax
this assumption in the hopes of building a better model and maybe gaining insight
into which relationships are the same and which ones are different across countries.
These findings could be guides in the development of future theories.
On the other hand, if random effects are unnecessarily included in multilevel mod-
els they can inhibit convergence. It is possible that the best fitting model requires the
exclusion of at least some random effects. It was no different in the case of this model
(see Table 7.1). The best fitting model included random effects for the intercept,
ethnic tensions and stability, all of which were significant. It is interesting that one of
the covariances between random effects was also significant with a negative sign, the
covariance between the intercept and stability. This means that countries with higher
intercepts of corruption tend to have a lower impact of stability on corruption and
vice versa. If you are highly corrupt in comparison to other countries, (controlling
for all other predictors) stability will have less of an impact on corruption.
When the autoregressive nature of the data was not controlled for, the impact of
trade openness on corruption also varied significantly between countries. This effect
went away when the autoregressive nature of the data was controlled for.
Finally it is important to note that the hypothesis tests for the random effects
are highly unreliable. They offer a rough guide as to how significant a random effect
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is, but the true test of significance can only be established through chi-square nested
model tests. Since I am not substantively interested in the random effects and since
the BIC provided us with a test of best fitting model, nested model tests to determine
precisely how significant each random effect is did not seem necessary.
7.2 Corruption’s Impact on Democratic Performance
To estimate the model of democratic performance the following multilevel model was
estimated:




• Between Country Predictors
- Colony of a Protestant Colonizer
- Colony of a Catholic Colonizer
The development of the democratic performance model involved the same steps
as the model of corruption. Both pooled effects and decomposed effects models were
run with and without AR1. Decomposed effects models fit much better than pooled
effect models (this is a change from the corruption model where the difference was
not substantial). And like with the corruption model, the AR1 control seems to be
needed as it yielded much better fitting models.
When AR1 was not controlled for, all random effects were significant, and therefore
the best fitting model was the one with all random effects included. This was not the
case once AR1 was controlled for. In fact none of the random effects appeared to be
significant. The best fitting model still included a single random effect, the random
effect of world position. The model based hypothesis test yielded a non-significant
variance component.
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It is probable that the model without any random effects would have been suf-
ficient. The benefits of being able to estimate different coefficients for each country
diminished in this scenario. On the other hand, it is still beneficial to use a multilevel
model versus a pooled time series model. The multilevel model uses a more powerful
estimator, the Empirical-Bayes maximum likelihood estimator versus ordinary least
squares of a pooled time series model. Power is irrelevant with very large sample
sizes, but as it was discussed before, this dataset suffers from issues that come with
a small sample size (even though it is almost a population). The model comparisons
can be found in Table 7.3. Results are in Table 7.4.
This model is much more interesting in regards to the differences between the
pooled and the decomposed models. The differences in model fit verify that the dif-
ferences are indeed vast. If we look at the pooled effect models, corruption is only
significant at the .10 and even that result does not replicate in models with more
random effects included. Once the longitudinal and cross-sectional effects of the pre-
dictors are decomposed the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of corruption and
world position become very significant. On the other hand the effects of development
do not reach significance in any of the models.
World system theorists argue that world position has an important impact on
a country’s democracy level. The developed countries are dependent on the raw
materials supplied from periphery countries. They have an incentive to uphold a
structure where transactions are easy, where governments are accountable towards the
trade partners, and not to the public. Relationship similar to the US Administration
and the Saudi Royal Family is apparently not an isolated cases.
Intuitively we would expect high collinearity between world position and develop-
ment but looking at the data, this is not the case. Of the 175 countries for which this
data is available, the 10 with the best trade positions include Cambodia, Bangladesh,
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Table 7.3: Model Comparisons for Democratic Performance
Estimated Models Average BIC converged
Baseline Model 14463.3 10
Pooled Model with 4 random effects without AR1 13733.2 10
Pooled Model with 4 random effects 9892.2 6
Pooled Model with 3 random effects (no intercept) 9882.0 6
Pooled Model with 2 random effects (Development and World Position) 9873.0 10
Pooled Model with 1 random effect (Corruption) 9873.4 10
Pooled Model with 1 random effect (Development) 9870.9 10
Pooled Model with 1 random effect (World Position) 9870.5 10
Pooled Model without random effects* 9873.2 10
Full Model with 4 random effects without AR1 13595.4 10
Full Model with 4 random effects 9782.4 7
Full Model with 3 random effects (no intercept) 9770.9 7
Full Model with 2 random effects (Development and World Position) 9766.1 10
Full Model with 1 random effect (Corruption) 9765.9 10
Full Model with 1 random effect (Development) 9763.8 10
Full Model with 1 random effect (World Position) 9763.2 10
Full Model without random effects* 9765.8 10
* Equivalent to Intercept’s random effect included. Intercept had no variance.
Table 7.4: Model Results for Democratic Performance
Pooled w/o AR1 Full w/o AR1 Pooled w/ AR1 Full w/ AR1







COV(World Position,Intercept) 1.810 1.083
COV(World Position,Corruption) -0.044 -0.045
COV(World Position,Development) -1.325 -1.185
VAR(World Position) 6.715** 5.517** 0.259 0.255
AR1 0.974*** 0.959***
Residual 1.771*** 1.747*** 15.396*** 9.918***
Intercept -5.058*** -6.113*** -4.903*** -6.15***
Protestant Colony 0.682 1.386*** 0.371 1.438***
Catholic Colony -1.700*** 0.876 -1.801*** 0.898
Pooled Effect of Corruption -0.0437 -0.047*+
Longitudinal Effect of Corruption 0.004 -0.035
Cross-sectional Effect of Corruption -1.889*** -1.84***
Pooled Effect of Development -0.080 -0.067
Longitudinal Effect of Development -0.400 -0.105
Cross-sectional Effect of Development 0.173 0.289
Pooled Effect of World Position 0.789** 0.210
Longitudinal Effect of World Position 0.604* 0.170
Cross-sectional Effect of World Position 4.644*** 4.382***
*< .10, **< .05, ***< .01
+ Not significant in models with 3 (all but Intercept) or 4 random effects included
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Nepal, Pakistan, Haiti and Albania; highly developed countries are lagging far be-
hind: the US is 33rd, the UK is 48th, Denmark is 60th, the Netherlands is 70th,
New Zealand is 89th and Australia 109th. Surprisingly the world position variable
achieved high significance and development did not achieve significance at all. This
empirically validates the arguments of world system theorists. The important pre-
dictor of countries’ democratic performance is where you are in the network of trade
relationships and not how developed they are3.
Turning to the cross-sectional predictors, colonial experience was reoperationalized
as countries that were colonized by protestant countries and countries that were colo-
nized by Catholic countries. The literature review extensively discusses how Catholic
institutions produce government structures that are at odds with democratic prin-
ciples. Protestant institutional philosophy is based on challenging authority, a core
democratic principle.
Furthermore the countries with a Protestant colonial past can also be seen as
proxies for British colonial influence. The only countries cited as having a Protes-
tant non-British colonizer are Suriname (Dutch), Samoa (German), Marshall Islands
(German) and Indonesia (Dutch). Out of these Suriname was first settled by the
Brits before it became a Dutch Colony (so it has sufficient British influence), Samoa
was under New Zealand’s, and the Marshall Islands was under the US’s control for as
long as under German influence. New Zealand and the US are former British Colonies
themselves.
Though a more extended approach was considered, entering a separate variable
for all colonial nuances would not have produced useful results due to lack of power.
To maintain parsimony, the use of Catholic and Protestant colonial experience was
3The world position measure was suggested by committee member Dr. Bill Avery. This study
validated the suggested measure beyond expectations. I believe Dr. Avery has invented a new
measure that deserves attention that extends well beyond this dissertation.
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sufficient to flush out institutional influences of the colonizer.
The the results of the analysis still remain puzzling. Based on the pooled model,
influences of a catholic colonizer has a significant effect on a country’s democratic
performance. But based on the decomposed model it is protestant colonial experience
that impacts democratic performance significantly. The direction of this effect is also
puzzling. While it is consistent with past findings, past research used a sample of only
underdeveloped countries. In my model the baseline was non-colonies. The results
show that protestant colonies tend to be more democratic than non-colonies. This
was unexpected given the population and the sample. Especially when we consider
that the United States and Australia were not the only colonies with a protestant
colonizer–Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Pakistan, Singapore, Uganda, and
Bangladesh are also on the list.
It is clear that the longitudinal variables have significant mediation or moderation
effects on colonial past. The pooled and decomposed effect models are supposed
to be equivalent models, so Level 2 coefficients should not change drastically. It is
interesting is that simple pooling of predictor effects can mediate/moderate differently
than the decomposed models. I intend to investigate this statistical phenomenon more
as I turn this chapter into an article.
7.3 The Causal Analysis
To conclude the analysis of corruption and democratic performance, I conducted a
causal analysis using the methods described in Chapter 4.3. So far, all past studies
(and also my quantitative analysis discussed so far) have presupposed a causal direc-
tion. The dependent variable is the effect and the predictors are the causes. Warren
has proposed a theoretical foundation for arguing that the direction of causation goes
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from corruption to democratic performance (2004).
Running the model introduced in Chapter 4.3 we find strong evidence to the con-
trary. It is democratic performance that drives the changes in corruption and not the
other way around as proposed by Warren (2004). And the evidence is unmistakable.
All imputations of all models have converged4. All ten estimated lag structures yield
the same results. The causal path going from corruption to democratic performance
does not reach significance for any one of the estimated models.
Table 7.5: Analysis of Causal Direction: Results
dem→cor T-score cor→dem T-score BIC
No Lag -0.04 -6.312 -0.022 -0.696 17902.101
1 Year Lag -0.039 -6.18 -0.008 -0.437 17902.879
2 Year Lag -0.034 -5.355 0.001 0.044 17908.458
3 Year Lag -0.03 -5.141 -0.016 -0.754 17914.982
4 Year Lag -0.027 -4.891 -0.008 -0.337 17919.985
5 Year Lag -0.026 -4.737 -0.012 -0.542 17919.253
6 Year Lag -0.027 -4.927 -0.003 -0.117 17919.066
7 Year Lag -0.029 -5.132 0.012 0.481 17912.891
8 Year Lag -0.029 -4.982 0.002 0.083 17915.498
9 Year Lag -0.029 -4.516 -0.001 -0.031 17918.004
Table 7.5 presents the causal paths and their T tests. The T tests show that
the causal paths going from democratic performance to corruption are all significant
at the .001 level, while none of the paths going the other direction are significant.
As in the case of the multilevel models, the BICs provide a comparative estimate of
model fit. According to the BICs the best fitting model is the non-recursive model
with no lag included. The one year lag model yield a fit that is very close to the
no lag model. Based on these results I can conclude that the effect of democratic
performance changes on corruption levels are almost immediate; they take no more
than a year.
4This is extremely rare for the model that includes the control factor to remove autocorrelation.
This suggests that the causal direction is exceptionally strong.
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These results suggest two things. One, Warren’s theoretical arguments did not
withstand empirical evaluation. Two, any attempts to curb corruption before struc-
tural adjustment funds are provided for a country are misguided. The IMF and the
World Bank have long been forerunners in battle against corruption. Often finan-
cial aid that aims to liberalize countries’ economies and decentralize political control
(hopefully leading to democratization) are conditioned on lowering the levels of cor-
ruption. These findings suggest that liberalization itself will lower corruption, while
not allocating adjustment funds because of corruption will prevent many countries
from taking their first steps towards democracy. The IMF and World Bank should
not make availability of funds dependent on corruption levels, though they might still
want to take precautions to ensure that financial aid does not land in Swiss bank ac-
counts. I realize that putting such precautions in place is more difficult than cutting
all funds. But in this case, taking the more difficult route will be more effective.
But it is important to consider two alternative explanations. It is possible that
Freedom House and PRS measurements of democratic performance and corruption
are not good operationalizations of Warren’s democratic performance and corruption.
Warren is very clear about his notions of corruption and the PRS description maps
well on this. Warren is much less clear concerning what is democratic and what is not
democratic. If either of these constructs does not posses sufficient validity from the
perspective of Warren’s theoretical argument, the results cannot be considered a good
empirical test of Warren’s theory. But I would argue that my corruption measure
maps perfectly to what Warren considers corruption. For democratic performance
measures, Freedom House is a highly reputable organization. Their measures are
considered the industry standard for measuring democratic performance. If there
is a disconnect between Warren’s notions of democracy and what Freedom House
measures, that further waken’s Warren’s theory, as it failed to use a clear and widely
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accepted definition of Democratic performance.
Secondly, Freedom House scores are high profile ratings of a country. Any country
expert, or organization, ranking corruption levels will be aware of movements of
FH scores. It is entirely possible that these experts and organizations inadvertently
incorporate FH ratings in their perceptions of corruption levels. The low lag time
suggests that this mechanism could drive the verified causal direction. But since
causal paths are highly persistent over time, it would be unreasonable to claim that
the causal direction is only driven by reactionary perceptions of country experts and
ranking organizations. Yet, it is important to note that the findings presented here
are only as good as the measures used to operationalize corruption and democratic
performance. Future cross-validation of the results with other measures of corruption




The presented studies show well the importance of the methodological advances this
dissertation set out to demonstrate. Multiple imputation made the model more gener-
alizable than past studies, which excluded cases with missing data, could accomplish.
The finding that British colonies are significantly more likely to be corrupt is con-
trary to all past findings. This change in results can only be explained by the more
encompassing model, yielding more generalizable results. Sample selection mecha-
nisms of past studies only included countries where all data was available, excluding
highly corrupt British colonies of the Middle East and other highly underdeveloped
areas that fail to report to data collection agencies. While my study strove for full
inclusion, I was still forced to exclude one former British colony, Afghanistan, as al-
most no data was available on it. Many other underdeveloped British colonies had
notable amounts of missing data. The treatment of such missing data can completely
change the findings.
Other studies have limited their samples to developing countries. It is entirely
possible that, among developing countries, British colonies are less corrupt, but I
would argue that such sample selections are misguided. First of all, most of the time,
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these sample selections are arbitrary. Second, it is important to include a broader
range of countries in comparative political economic research. Developing countries
are usually studied to explore how their situations can be improved. The exclusion
of successful countries inhibits the isolation of the predictors of success.
Furthermore British colonial experience is a poor variable. First of all, it does not
distinguish between resource and settler colonies. Secondly, a dichotomous variable
is only as meaningful as its baseline is. The baseline for British colonies is quite
meaningless as it includes colonizers, countries that were never colonies, and colonies
of other countries. This extremely diverse group of countries does not appear to be
a consistently meaningful baseline. Future research will need to decompose these
groups better.
But even the presented, highly complex and advanced missing data treatment
needs to be used with caution. Missing data treatments come with assumptions.
If these assumptions do not hold, the results will not be trustworthy. The most
important of these is the assumption about the missing data mechanism. I argued
from a theoretical point of view that the missing at random (MAR) assumption is a
reasonable one in my study (and in all multivariate comparative political economical
research that uses data from a diverse number of sources). This assumption needs to
be evaluated for each study that makes assumptions about missing data.
Imputation methods come with additional, time consuming analyses. Most of
these are not implemented in user friendly packages. Usually, the missing data model’s
adequacy needs testing. For example, my initial attempts to use PAN failed due to
non-convergence. Convergence was not automatically diagnosed by the software. I
had to do the diagnostics manually.
Secondly, current multiple imputation methods for multilevel data structures are
only capable of producing imputations on the first level of analysis. Hopefully pro-
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cedures that can do imputations on multiple levels will become available in the near
future.
And finally, Amelia II’s diagnostics show that even these missing data treatments
are not completely unbiased. Bias is likely as missing data moves towards the ex-
tremes. Procedures like those offered by Amelia II go a long way towards producing
unbiased estimates, but they are not perfect, as the uncertainty of missing values is
still underestimated. Even with these problems, I would argue it is better to use mul-
tiple imputation methods than not use them. Convenient, ungeneralizable samples
are less preferable than moderate levels of bias. Listwise deletion rests on more strin-
gent assumptions than multiple imputation (if complete generalizability is assumed).
Mean imputations can create analytical disasters, as they produce highly kurtotic
non-normal variables. Single imputations reduce standard errors and increase the
probability of Type 1 errors producing more biased estimates.
Moving to a discussion of the analytical methods, autoregressive multilevel models
turned out to be preferable to methods not allowing random variation of parameters
across countries. The model of corruption has shown that the inclusion of random
effects is necessary because parameters do vary significantly across countries. This
will not always be the case. The model of democratic performance had no significant
random effects, so a pooled time series model would have been sufficient to produce
unbiased estimates. All together, multilevel models have more power than OLS meth-
ods. It is always desirable to use the more powerful method, even if random effects
need not be included in the model. Autoregressive restrictions of error variances were
necessary in both analyses.
The techniques that separated longitudinal and cross-sectional predictor effects
produced results that past studies could not, due to lack of methodological sophisti-
cation and lack of longitudinal data. My model of democratic performance was not
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able to pick up corruption as a strong correlate unless the longitudinal and cross-
sectional effects were separated out. This is evidence of aggregation bias which the
proposed methods are good at detecting. Also, it is substantively important that
the effect of ethnic tensions on corruption is predominantly longitudinal. This means
that high ethnic tension does not necessarily mean high levels of corruption. It is
escalation of ethnic conflict which triggers rising corruption levels. Ethnic conflict
should be less of a concern for anti-corruption programs than escalation of conflict.
My dissertation has also isolated methodological anomalies in regards to pooled
and separated predictor effects. The model of democratic performance yielded dif-
ferent findings on the country level for the pooled and separated predictor models.
This should not occur, as the two models should be equivalent in all aspects but their
separation of predictor effects. This anomaly deserves more attention and is grounds
for further methodological research.
Finally, the causal model also turned out to be invaluable for correct inference.
Multilevel analysis assumes that the predictors are causes of the dependent variable
without testing this assumption. The model of democratic performance has verified
Warren’s theory and identified corruption as a predictor of democratic performance.
But the causal analysis clearly shows that the causal direction does not go from
corruption to democratic performance, it goes the other way–casting doubt on the
empirical validity of Warren’s theory. It is dangerous to interpret correlates identified
by regression models (or regression’s more complex cousins like multilevel models). All
these models can identify are correlates. Causation remains an untested assumption.
The causal structural equation model proposed here allows empirical verification of
causal direction when panel data is available. In this case the test of causal direction
prevented a false inference from the model of democratic performance.
Moving to the substantive findings of the corruption model, government intru-
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siveness is a strong predictor of corruption. Unfortunately due to the lack of freely
available longitudinal measures, government intrusiveness was turned into a country
level variable. To strengthen this claim better measures are needed.
Secondly, while findings were not strong or consistent across all models analyzed,
the data does suggest that government pay is either not related to corruption or is
positively related. This is contrary to the claims of Montinola and Jackman who
suggested that underpaid government workers are more likely to be corrupt but failed
to provide convincing empirical evidence (2002). My results are not strong enough
to claim that there is a positive relationship between corruption and government
wages, but it is strong enough to claim that Montinola and Jackman’s proposition of
a negative relationship is unlikely.
If a country wishes to fight corruption raising their public official’s wages is prob-
ably the wrong step for many reasons. One is the lack of evidence that higher payed
government officials are less corrupt. But also, high government wages can create
mistrust between the government and the people. Hibbing and Alford claims that
people want non-self interested decision makers in their government (2004). If these
officials are there for the high pay, they are (by definition) self interested elevating
public distrust. Also, the highly self interested individuals who would be attracted to
the high paying positions might also be the ones who look for avenues to make more
money even if it means being corrupt.
Montinola and Jackman also suggested that OPEC countries are highly corrupt
(2002). This is in line with the general conception of westerners of an oil producing
country. My analysis suggests that with all the other variables controlled for the
effects of oil diminish completely.
The analysis yielded some evidence that trade openness is a positive correlate of
corruption. While, once again, this is contradicting past findings, this relationship
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makes sense. Trade liberalization is usually accompanied by surges of trade. Many
companies will attempt to get access to newly opened up resources (may it be raw
materials or markets). As we know businesses are willing to go to the distance to
gain more favorable access to new resources. It is possible that the business interest is
driving the surges of corruption for countries that provide new access. But even if we
avoid placing all the blame on the companies, more liberal trade policies always mean
higher influx of money. More money means more money to pocket. And finally the
perception component of our corruption measure might also be a driving force for this
relationship. When there is trade competition, some firms will lose out. Accusations
of corruption will be thrown around by the losers even if they are unfounded. The
more open trade is, the more ”experts” who were interviewed could be representatives
of firms that lost economical battles in newly free and open markets.
The relationship of stability and corruption appears to be a complex one. The
analysis suggests the existence of some aggregation bias. The short term effects of
stability on corruption (though not well defined) show a positive relationship. The
cross-sectional effects are a clear negative. As figure 8.1 shows, this suggests that
during times of stabilization corruption will likely surge but in the long run, it will
diminish.
Turning to the empirical analysis of Warren’s theory on corruption’s impact on
democratic performance. Corruption was identified as correlate of democratic per-
formance once the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects were separated out. This
suggests that some aggregation bias exists with corruption, though the direction of
the relationships were never opposites as with stability and corruption. The aggrega-
tion bias here is probably based on longitudinal effects being highly insignificant and
cross-sectional effects being strongly significant. When these effects were pooled, the
significance of the cross-sectional effects were diminished by the highly insignificant
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Figure 8.1: Changes in Corruption Levels After Stabilization
longitudinal effects.
This relationship would suggest that Warren’s theory has empirical foundations
but the causal analysis casts doubt on these findings. As I already noted, covariation
identified in a multilevel model cannot be interpreted causally. Causal direction is
always an untested assumption of multilevel (and similar regression based) models.
Secondly, development is not a significant predictor of democratic performance,
once corruption and world position is controlled for. World system theorists suggested
that raw material exporting countries on the periphery of the world economy will be
more authoritarian (Chase-Dunn 1975, Wallerstein 1980). Western countries often
have strong incentives to keep dictators in power as long as they are Western friendly.
The US-Saudi Royal Family relation is the often cited, but as this analysis suggests
is probably not an isolated case. Leaders who are more accountable to their public
have little incentive to keep prices at levels where the buyers want them to be. The
west has little incentive to push for democratization in these countries.
While the world system theorist argument was highly prevalent in the 70’s and
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80’s, since the fall of communism such analyses have disappeared. The Bush admin-
istration did receive some heat for only wanting to spread democracy in countries
where the leader is not US friendly, and making friends in highly authoritarian coun-
tries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Middle Eastern countries. The
administration justified these friendships as crucial on the war on terror. A case by
case analysis would be needed to determine if this finding is predominantly driven
by the Middle Eastern countries or there are other areas of the world where such
unwritten contracts between the West and local dictators are still in place. This area
is fertile ground for qualitative researcher to contribute.
And finally turning to the causal analysis, it is clear that the causal direction
between the two main variables of interest goes from democratic performance to
corruption and not the other way around as Warren’s theory suggests. While the
effect sizes are modest, the direction of causation is persistent for all lag structures
evaluated. Small effect size could be the reason why longitudinal effect between
corruption and democratic performance were not detected by either analysis, yet the
causal effect of democratic performance on corruption is almost immediate.
The implications of this finding are vast for organization like the IMF and the
World Bank that consider democratization as a primary goal. Both of these organi-
zations have been known to require countries who wish to be recipients of loans and
aid to drive down their corruption levels. This is understandable, aid (and loans) do
little good if they land in Swiss bank accounts of corrupt leaders. One way of pre-
venting private gain from structural aid is not giving it out, but the causal findings
suggests that this policy needs to be reconsidered.
Corruption will slowly diminish with democratization. Structural aid is usually
given out to accelerate the establishment of democratic institutions and supporting
economic and public infrastructures. It is important to insure that the allocated funds
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reach their desired target, but not giving them out due to high levels of corruption
might be counterproductive.
The IMF and the World bank needs to develop methods that insure that funds
reach the desired targets even in highly corrupt countries. This will not be easy.
Possible solutions could be creating competition for the limited available funds. Ad-
ditional funds could be contingent on the efficient use of lesser past funds. Increased
oversight by World Bank and IMF officials would also be desirable.
But the World Bank and the IMF needs to worry about corruption for reasons
independent of recipient countries. The contributors of funds are also turned off by
inefficient use. If a contributor finds that their money is allocated to highly corrupt
countries, future contributions might suffer. This is a fine balance that aid granting
organizations need to walk. The findings in this study will not make their job easier.
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Appendix A
List of Included Countries
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, The, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria,
Burkina-Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville),
Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus (Greek), Czech Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, East Germany, West
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, South Korea,
Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Malta, Marshal Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
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Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Principe, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, USSR,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Appendix B
SITC Rev. 1 Classifications
Raw materials are bolded:
• Food and live animals (S1-0)
• Beverages and tobacco (S1-1)
• Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (S1-2)
• Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (S1-3)
• Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (S1-4)
• Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. (S1-5)
– Chemical elements and compounds (S1-51)
– Crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and gas (S1-52)
– Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials (S1-53)
– Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (S1-54)
– Perfume materials, toilet & cleansing preptio (S1-55)
– Fertilizers, manufactured (S1-56)
– Explosives and pyrotechnic products (S1-57)
– Plastic materials, etc. (S1-58)
– Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. (S1-59)
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• Manufactured goods classified chiefly by mate (S1-6)
– Leather, lthr. Manufs., n.e.s. & dressed fur ski (S1-61)
– Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. (S1-62)
– Wood and cork manufactures excluding furnitur (S1-63)
– Paper, paperboard and manufactures thereof (S1-64)
– Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles, etc. (S1-65)
– Non metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. (S1-66)
– Iron and steel (S1-67)
– Non ferrous metals (S1-68)
– Manufactures of metal, n.e.s. (S1-69)
• Machinery and transport equipment (S1-7)
– Machinery, other than electric (S1-71)
– Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliance (S1-72)
– Transport equipment (S1-73)
• Miscellaneous manufactured articles (S1-8)
– Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixt (S1-81)
– Furniture (S1-82)
– Travel goods, handbags and similar articles (S1-83)
– Clothing (S1-84)
– Footwear (S1-85)
– Scientif & control instrum, photogr gds, cloc (S1-86)
– Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. (S1-89)
• Commodities and transactions not classified (S1-9)
– Special transact. Not class. According to kin (S1-93)
– Animals, nes, incl. Zoo animals, dogs and cat (S1-94)
– Firearms of war and ammunition therefor (S1-95)
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*** Truncation of AID, FDI and ODA.
RECODE AID1984 AID1985 AID1986 AID1987 AID1988 AID1989 AID1990 AID1991 AID1992
AID1993 AID1994 AID1995 AID1996 AID1997 AID1998 AID1999 AID2000 AID2001 AID2002
AID2003 AID2004 FDI1984 FDI1985 FDI1986 FDI1987 FDI1988 FDI1989 FDI1990 FDI1991
FDI1992 FDI1993 FDI1994 FDI1995 FDI1996 FDI1997 FDI1998 FDI1999 FDI2000 FDI2001
FDI2002 FDI2003 FDI2004 ODA1984 ODA1985 ODA1986 ODA1987 ODA1988 ODA1989 ODA1990
ODA1991 ODA1992 ODA1993 ODA1994 ODA1995 ODA1996 ODA1997 ODA1998 ODA1999 ODA2000


































































































































































RECODE AID1984 AID1985 AID1986 AID1987 AID1988 AID1989 AID1990 AID1991 AID1992
AID1993 AID1994 AID1995 AID1996 AID1997 AID1998 AID1999 AID2000 AID2001 AID2002
AID2003 AID2004 FDI1984 FDI1985 FDI1986 FDI1987 FDI1988 FDI1989 FDI1990 FDI1991
FDI1992 FDI1993 FDI1994 FDI1995 FDI1996 FDI1997 FDI1998 FDI1999 FDI2000 FDI2001
FDI2002 FDI2003 FDI2004 ODA1984 ODA1985 ODA1986 ODA1987 ODA1988 ODA1989 ODA1990
ODA1991 ODA1992 ODA1993 ODA1994 ODA1995 ODA1996 ODA1997 ODA1998 ODA1999 ODA2000
ODA2001 ODA2002 ODA2003 ODA2004 BRITCOL CATHCOL commonlaw cor1984 cor1985
cor1986 cor1987 cor1988 cor1989 cor1990 cor1991 cor1992 cor1993 cor1994 cor1995
cor1996 cor1997 cor1998 cor1999 cor2000 cor2001 cor2002 cor2003 cor2004 En1984
En1985 En1986 En1987 En1988 En1989 En1990 En1991 En1992 En1993 En1994 En1995
En1996 En1997 En1998 En1999 En2000 En2001 En2002 En2003 En2004 eth1984 eth1985
eth1986 eth1987 eth1988 eth1989 eth1990 eth1991 eth1992 eth1993 eth1994 eth1995
eth1996 eth1997 eth1998 eth1999 eth2000 eth2001 eth2002 eth2003 eth2004 FEDERAL
fh1984 fh1985 fh1986 fh1987 fh1988 fh1989 fh1990 fh1991 fh1992 fh1993 fh1994
fh1995 fh1996 fh1997 fh1998 fh1999 fh2000 fh2001 fh2002 fh2003 fh2004 FUEL1984
FUEL1985 FUEL1986 FUEL1987 FUEL1988 FUEL1989 FUEL1990 FUEL1991 FUEL1992
FUEL1993 FUEL1994 FUEL1995 FUEL1996 FUEL1997 FUEL1998 FUEL1999 FUEL2000
FUEL2001 FUEL2002 FUEL2003 FUEL2004 GDP1984 GDP1985 GDP1986 GDP1987 GDP1988
GDP1989 GDP1990 GDP1991 GDP1992 GDP1993 GDP1994 GDP1995 GDP1996 GDP1997 GDP1998
GDP1999 GDP2000 GDP2001 GDP2002 GDP2003 GDP2004 govint govwage imp1984 imp1985
imp1986 imp1987 imp1988 imp1989 imp1990 imp1991 imp1992 imp1993 imp1994 imp1995
imp1996 imp1997 imp1998 imp1999 imp2000 imp2001 imp2002 imp2003 imp2004 MIN1984
MIN1985 MIN1986 MIN1987 MIN1988 MIN1989 MIN1990 MIN1991 MIN1992 MIN1993 MIN1994
MIN1995 MIN1996 MIN1997 MIN1998 MIN1999 MIN2000 MIN2001 MIN2002 MIN2003 MIN2004
ORIG PROT PROTCOL rawexp1984 rawexp1985 rawexp1986 rawexp1987 rawexp1988
rawexp1989 rawexp1990 rawexp1991 rawexp1992 rawexp1993 rawexp1994 rawexp1995
rawexp1996 rawexp1997 rawexp1998 rawexp1999 rawexp2000 rawexp2001 rawexp2002
rawexp2003 rawexp2004 stab1984 stab1985 stab1986 stab1987 stab1988 stab1989
stab1990 stab1991 stab1992 stab1993 stab1994 stab1995 stab1996 stab1997
stab1998 stab1999 stab2000 stab2001 stab2002 stab2003 stab2004 (-999=SYSMIS)
. EXECUTE .
































/make cor from cor1984 cor1985 cor1986 cor1987 cor1988 cor1989 cor1990 cor1991 cor1992 cor1993 cor1994
cor1995 cor1996 cor1997 cor1998 cor1999 cor2000 cor2001 cor2002 cor2003 cor2004
/make fh from fh1984 fh1985 fh1986 fh1987 fh1988 fh1989 fh1990 fh1991 fh1992 fh1993 fh1994 fh1995
fh1996 fh1997 fh1998 fh1999 fh2000 fh2001 fh2002 fh2003 fh2004
/make eth from eth1984 eth1985 eth1986 eth1987 eth1988 eth1989 eth1990 eth1991 eth1992 eth1993 eth1994
eth1995 eth1996 eth1997 eth1998 eth1999 eth2000 eth2001 eth2002 eth2003 eth2004
/make gdp from GDP1984 GDP1985 GDP1986 GDP1987 GDP1988 GDP1989 GDP1990 GDP1991 GDP1992 GDP1993 GDP1994
GDP1995 GDP1996 GDP1997 GDP1998 GDP1999 GDP2000 GDP2001 GDP2002 GDP2003 GDP2004
/make imp from imp1984 imp1985 imp1986 imp1987 imp1988 imp1989 imp1990 imp1991 imp1992 imp1993 imp1994
imp1995 imp1996 imp1997 imp1998 imp1999 imp2000 imp2001 imp2002 imp2003 imp2004
/make fuel from FUEL1984 FUEL1985 FUEL1986 FUEL1987 FUEL1988 FUEL1989 FUEL1990 FUEL1991 FUEL1992 FUEL1993
FUEL1994 FUEL1995 FUEL1996 FUEL1997 FUEL1998 FUEL1999 FUEL2000 FUEL2001 FUEL2002 FUEL2003 FUEL2004
/make min from MIN1984 MIN1985 MIN1986 MIN1987 MIN1988 MIN1989 MIN1990 MIN1991 MIN1992 MIN1993 MIN1994
MIN1995 MIN1996 MIN1997 MIN1998 MIN1999 MIN2000 MIN2001 MIN2002 MIN2003 MIN2004
/make stab from stab1984 stab1985 stab1986 stab1987 stab1988 stab1989 stab1990 stab1991 stab1992 stab1993
stab1994 stab1995 stab1996 stab1997 stab1998 stab1999 stab2000 stab2001 stab2002 stab2003 stab2004
/make en from En1984 En1985 En1986 En1987 En1988 En1989 En1990 En1991 En1992 En1993 En1994 En1995
En1996 En1997 En1998 En1999 En2000 En2001 En2002 En2003 En2004
/make rexp from rawexp1984 rawexp1985 rawexp1986 rawexp1987 rawexp1988 rawexp1989 rawexp1990
rawexp1991 rawexp1992 rawexp1993 rawexp1994 rawexp1995 rawexp1996 rawexp1997 rawexp1998 rawexp1999
rawexp2000 rawexp2001 rawexp2002 rawexp2003 rawexp2004
/make aid from AID1984 AID1985 AID1986 AID1987 AID1988 AID1989 AID1990 AID1991 AID1992 AID1993
AID1994 AID1995 AID1996 AID1997 AID1998 AID1999 AID2000 AID2001 AID2002 AID2003 AID2004
/make fdi from FDI1984 FDI1985 FDI1986 FDI1987 FDI1988 FDI1989 FDI1990 FDI1991 FDI1992 FDI1993
FDI1994 FDI1995 FDI1996 FDI1997 FDI1998 FDI1999 FDI2000 FDI2001 FDI2002 FDI2003 FDI2004
/make oda from ODA1984 ODA1985 ODA1986 ODA1987 ODA1988 ODA1989 ODA1990 ODA1991 ODA1992 ODA1993
ODA1994 ODA1995 ODA1996 ODA1997 ODA1998 ODA1999 ODA2000 ODA2001 ODA2002 ODA2003 ODA2004
/index=measure(21)
/keep=ORIG PROT PROTCOL BRITCOL CATHCOL commonlaw FEDERAL govint govwage




















FILE=’C:\Documents and Settings\Levente Littvay\My Documents\dis\disstackedforexploration.sav’.
**Explore your data.**.
*Create separate scatterplots for corruption.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(orig<56).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’orig<56 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
*** batch2
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>55 & ORIG<101).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>55 & ORIG<101 (FILTER)’.













COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>100 & ORIG<154).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>100 & ORIG<154 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Batch 4
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>153 & ORIG<202).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>153 & ORIG<202 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Plots for FH.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(orig<39).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’orig<39 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Batch 2.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>38 & ORIG<77).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>38 & ORIG<77 (FILTER)’.













COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>76 & ORIG<115).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>76 & ORIG<115 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Batch 4.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>114 & ORIG<154).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>114 & ORIG<154 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Batch 5.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>155 & ORIG<195).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>155 & ORIG<195 (FILTER)’.









/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
* Batch 6
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>162 & ORIG<202).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>162 & ORIG<202 (FILTER)’.










/line(mode) key=off style=dotline interpolate=spline.
*Be sure keep only last 4 from this last batch.
*Create separate scatterplots for cor+dem.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(orig<56).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’orig<56 (FILTER)’.














COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>55 & ORIG<101).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>55 & ORIG<101 (FILTER)’.














COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>100 & ORIG<154).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>100 & ORIG<154 (FILTER)’.















COMPUTE filter_$=(ORIG>153 & ORIG<202).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ ’ORIG>153 & ORIG<202 (FILTER)’.








































title: Missing data test model;
data: file is disnomi.dat;
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variable: names are ORIG prot protcol britcol cathcol comlaw federal govint
govwage avgaid avgcor avgen avgeth avgfdi avgfh avgfuel avggdp
avgimp avgmin avgoda avgrexp avgstab measure cor fh eth gdp imp





missing are all (-999);








*** WARNING in Model command
Variable is uncorrelated with all other variables: FH
*** WARNING in Model command
All least one variable is uncorrelated with all other variables in the model.
Check that this is what is intended.
2 WARNING(S) FOUND IN THE INPUT INSTRUCTIONS
Missing data test model;
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Number of groups 1
Number of observations 3540
Number of dependent variables 1
Number of independent variables 0








Optimization Specifications for the Quasi-Newton Algorithm for
Continuous Outcomes
Maximum number ofciterations 1000
Convergence criterion 0.100D-05
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Optimization Specifications for the EM Algorithm
Maximum number ofciterations 500
Convergence criteria
Loglikelihood change 0.100D-02
Relative loglikelihood change 0.100D-05
Derivative 0.100D-02
Optimization Specifications for the M step of the EM Algorithm for
Categorical Latent variables
Number of M stepciterations 1
M step convergence criterion 0.100D-02
Basis for M step termination citeRATION
Optimization Specifications for the M step of the EM Algorithm for
Censored, Binary or Ordered Categorical (Ordinal), Unordered
Categorical (Nominal) and Count Outcomes
Number of M stepciterations 1
M step convergence criterion 0.100D-02
Basis for M step termination citeRATION
Maximum value for logit thresholds 15
Minimum value for logit thresholds -15
Minimum expected cell size for chi-square 0.100D-01
Maximum number ofciterations for H1 2000




Number of integration points 1
Dimensions of numerical integration 0
Adaptive quadrature OFF




Input data format FREE
SUMMARY OF DATA
Number of patterns 1
Number of clusters 186
Size (s) Cluster ID with Size s





12 48 155 156 59 30
13 25 123 11 107
14 16 60 114 118 119 66 8 145
44 91 97 172 181 184 99 190
105




19 147 74 96
20 58
21 52 53 13 55 56 57 14 15
5 61 62 63 64 65 17 18
19 20 70 71 72 73 21 75
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 6
92 93 95 23 24 98 7 26
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101 102 103 27 106 28 108 109
110 29 112 113 2 115 116 117
31 32 121 122 33 34 126 127
128 129 130 131 132 133 134 35
136 137 138 139 140 36 142 143
144 37 146 38 39 150 151 152
153 154 40 41 157 159 160 161
162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169
170 171 42 43 174 175 176 177
178 179 180 9 183 46 185 186
187 188 10 3 191 192 193 50
12 200 201
COVARIANCE COVERAGE OF DATA
Minimum covariance coverage value 0.100





THE MODEL ESTIMATION TERMINATED NORMALLY
TESTS OF MODEL FIT
Loglikelihood
H0 Value -7226.023
H0 Scaling Correction Factor 7.961
for MLR
Information Criteria
Number of Free Parameters 3
Akaike (AIC) 14458.047
Bayesian (BIC) 14476.562
Sample-Size Adjusted BIC 14467.030





FH 2.739 0.317 8.629
Between Level
Means
FH -5.364 0.269 -19.946
132
Variances
FH 13.296 0.849 15.670
QUALITY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
Condition Number for the Information Matrix 0.679E-03











Copyright (c) 1998-2006 Muthen & Muthen






data: file is c:\mplus\dis\rndflat.dat;
type=imputation;
variable: names are ORIG PROT PROTCOL BRITCOL CATHCOL COMLAW FEDERAL
GOVINT1-GOVINT21 GOVWAG1-GOVWAG21 COR1-COR21 FH1-FH21
ETH1-ETH21 GDP1-GDP21 IMP1-IMP21 FUEL1-FUEL21 MIN1-MIN21
STAB1-STAB21 EN1-EN21 REXP1-REXP21 AID1-AID21 FDI1-FDI21
ODA1-ODA21 govint govwage avgfh avgcor avgeth avggdp avgimp
avgfuel avgmin avgstab avgen avgrexp avgaid avgfdi avgoda;












































COR2 on FH1 (1);
COR3 on FH2 (1);
COR4 on FH3 (1);
COR5 on FH4 (1);
COR6 on FH5 (1);
COR7 on FH6 (1);
COR8 on FH7 (1);
COR9 on FH8 (1);
COR10 on FH9 (1);
COR11 on FH10 (1);
COR12 on FH11 (1);
COR13 on FH12 (1);
COR14 on FH13 (1);
COR15 on FH14 (1);
COR16 on FH15 (1);
COR17 on FH16 (1);
COR18 on FH17 (1);
COR19 on FH18 (1);
COR20 on FH19 (1);
COR21 on FH20 (1);
FH2 on COR1 (2);
FH3 on COR2 (2);
FH4 on COR3 (2);
FH5 on COR4 (2);
FH6 on COR5 (2);
FH7 on COR6 (2);
FH8 on COR7 (2);
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FH9 on COR8 (2);
FH10 on COR9 (2);
FH11 on COR10 (2);
FH12 on COR11 (2);
FH13 on COR12 (2);
FH14 on COR13 (2);
FH15 on COR14 (2);
FH16 on COR15 (2);
FH17 on COR16 (2);
FH18 on COR17 (2);
FH19 on COR18 (2);
FH20 on COR19 (2);






















omautcor by COR2* COR3-COR21 FH2-FH21;
omautcor with COR1 FH1;
COR1 FH1;
omautcor@1;
INPUT READING TERMINATED NORMALLY
Causal;
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Number of groups 1




Number of dependent variables 40
Number of independent variables 2




COR2 COR3 COR4 COR5 COR6 COR7
COR8 COR9 COR10 COR11 COR12 COR13
COR14 COR15 COR16 COR17 COR18 COR19
COR20 COR21 FH2 FH3 FH4 FH5
FH6 FH7 FH8 FH9 FH10 FH11
FH12 FH13 FH14 FH15 FH16 FH17







Maximum number ofciterations 10000
Convergence criterion 0.500D-04
Maximum number of steepest descentciterations 20
Maximum number ofciterations for H1 2000
Convergence criterion for H1 0.100D-03
Input data file(s)
Multiple data files from
c:\mplus\dis\rndflat.dat
Input data format FREE
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR THE FIRST REPLICATION
Number of patterns 15
SUMMARY OF MISSING DATA PATTERNS FOR THE FIRST REPLICATION
MISSING DATA PATTERNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
COR2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR7 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR9 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR10 x x x x x x x x x x x x
COR11 x x x x x x x x x x x
COR12 x x x x x x x x x x
COR13 x x x x x x x x x
COR14 x x x x x x x x
COR15 x x x x x x x
COR16 x x x x x x
COR17 x x x x x
COR18 x x x x
COR19 x x x
COR20 x x
COR21 x
FH2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
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FH3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH7 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH9 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH10 x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH11 x x x x x x x x x x x
FH12 x x x x x x x x x x
FH13 x x x x x x x x x
FH14 x x x x x x x x
FH15 x x x x x x x
FH16 x x x x x x
FH17 x x x x x
FH18 x x x x
FH19 x x x
FH20 x x
FH21 x
COR1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
FH1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
MISSING DATA PATTERN FREQUENCIES
Pattern Frequency Pattern Frequency Pattern Frequency
1 139 6 1 11 2
2 1 7 3 12 1
3 3 8 17 13 2
4 1 9 4 14 1
5 2 10 5 15 4
COVARIANCE COVERAGE OF DATA FOR THE FIRST REPLICATION
Minimum covariance coverage value 0.100
PROPORTION OF DATA PRESENT
... excluded to save trees ...
SAMPLE STATISTICS FOR THE FIRST DATA SET
ESTIMATED SAMPLE STATISTICS
Means
... excluded to save trees ...
Covariances
... excluded to save trees ...
Correlations
... excluded to save trees ...
MAXIMUM LOG-LIKELIHOOD VALUE FOR THE UNRESTRICTED (H1) MODEL IS -7708.909
TESTS OF MODEL FIT
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Number of Free Parameters 189
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit
Degrees of freedom 756
Mean 1357.228
Std Dev 76.731
Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 668.492 1278.059
0.980 1.000 678.302 1278.059
0.950 1.000 693.198 1278.059
0.900 1.000 706.615 1278.059
0.800 1.000 723.095 1278.059
0.700 1.000 735.136 1309.125
0.500 1.000 755.333 1321.466
0.300 1.000 775.898 1369.732
0.200 1.000 788.516 1373.911
0.100 1.000 806.241 1408.788
0.050 1.000 821.076 1408.788
0.020 1.000 837.987 1408.788





Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 0.900 0.949 0.948
0.980 0.900 0.951 0.948
0.950 0.900 0.953 0.948
0.900 0.900 0.955 0.948
0.800 0.900 0.957 0.948
0.700 0.800 0.958 0.959
0.500 0.600 0.961 0.962
0.300 0.400 0.963 0.964
0.200 0.100 0.965 0.964
0.100 0.000 0.967 0.965
0.050 0.000 0.969 0.965
0.020 0.000 0.971 0.965




Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 0.900 0.943 0.941
0.980 0.900 0.944 0.941
0.950 0.900 0.946 0.941
0.900 0.900 0.948 0.941
0.800 0.900 0.951 0.941
0.700 0.800 0.953 0.953
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0.500 0.600 0.955 0.957
0.300 0.400 0.958 0.959
0.200 0.100 0.960 0.959
0.100 0.000 0.963 0.960
0.050 0.000 0.965 0.960
0.020 0.000 0.967 0.960





Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 -8650.415 -8632.612
0.980 0.900 -8627.821 -8632.612
0.950 0.900 -8593.939 -8632.612
0.900 0.800 -8563.828 -8632.612
0.800 0.800 -8527.360 -8632.612
0.700 0.800 -8501.070 -8488.259
0.500 0.600 -8457.606 -8456.355
0.300 0.400 -8414.143 -8401.471
0.200 0.200 -8387.853 -8397.173
0.100 0.100 -8351.385 -8386.535
0.050 0.000 -8321.274 -8386.535
0.020 0.000 -8287.392 -8386.535




Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 -7959.294 -7945.657
0.980 0.900 -7938.166 -7945.657
0.950 0.900 -7906.482 -7945.657
0.900 0.800 -7878.324 -7945.657
0.800 0.800 -7844.221 -7945.657
0.700 0.800 -7819.636 -7812.168
0.500 0.600 -7778.992 -7747.506
0.300 0.400 -7738.348 -7734.264
0.200 0.200 -7713.763 -7725.861
0.100 0.000 -7679.661 -7708.909
0.050 0.000 -7651.503 -7708.909
0.020 0.000 -7619.818 -7708.909





Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 16907.596 17073.589
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0.980 1.000 16952.783 17073.589
0.950 1.000 17020.547 17073.589
0.900 0.900 17080.770 17073.589
0.800 0.800 17153.706 17073.589
0.700 0.600 17206.286 17172.345
0.500 0.400 17293.213 17238.510
0.300 0.200 17380.140 17311.460
0.200 0.200 17432.720 17354.519
0.100 0.200 17505.656 17515.760
0.050 0.100 17565.878 17515.760
0.020 0.100 17633.643 17515.760




Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 17517.262 17683.255
0.980 1.000 17562.449 17683.255
0.950 1.000 17630.214 17683.255
0.900 0.900 17690.436 17683.255
0.800 0.800 17763.372 17683.255
0.700 0.600 17815.952 17782.011
0.500 0.400 17902.879 17848.177
0.300 0.200 17989.806 17921.126
0.200 0.200 18042.386 17964.185
0.100 0.200 18115.322 18125.426
0.050 0.100 18175.544 18125.426
0.020 0.100 18243.309 18125.426
0.010 0.000 18288.496 18125.426
Sample-Size Adjusted BIC (n* = (n + 2) / 24)
Mean 17304.248
Std Dev 165.764
Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 16918.631 17084.625
0.980 1.000 16963.818 17084.625
0.950 1.000 17031.583 17084.625
0.900 0.900 17091.805 17084.625
0.800 0.800 17164.741 17084.625
0.700 0.600 17217.322 17183.381
0.500 0.400 17304.248 17249.546
0.300 0.200 17391.175 17322.495
0.200 0.200 17443.755 17365.554
0.100 0.200 17516.692 17526.795
0.050 0.100 17576.914 17526.795
0.020 0.100 17644.678 17526.795
0.010 0.000 17689.865 17526.795
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation)
Mean 0.065
Std Dev 0.004
Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
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0.990 1.000 0.056 0.061
0.980 1.000 0.057 0.061
0.950 1.000 0.059 0.061
0.900 1.000 0.060 0.061
0.800 0.900 0.062 0.061
0.700 0.700 0.063 0.063
0.500 0.400 0.065 0.063
0.300 0.200 0.067 0.066
0.200 0.100 0.069 0.066
0.100 0.100 0.070 0.068
0.050 0.100 0.072 0.068
0.020 0.100 0.073 0.068
0.010 0.100 0.075 0.068
SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual)
Mean 0.045
Std Dev 0.003
Number of successful computations 10
Proportions Percentiles
Expected Observed Expected Observed
0.990 1.000 0.036 0.041
0.980 1.000 0.037 0.041
0.950 1.000 0.039 0.041
0.900 1.000 0.040 0.041
0.800 0.600 0.042 0.041
0.700 0.600 0.043 0.041
0.500 0.400 0.045 0.043
0.300 0.300 0.046 0.046
0.200 0.300 0.047 0.047
0.100 0.100 0.049 0.048
0.050 0.100 0.050 0.048
0.020 0.100 0.052 0.048




COR2 -0.941 0.126 -7.456
COR3 -0.951 0.203 -4.679
COR4 -0.987 0.252 -3.910
COR5 -1.055 0.293 -3.604
COR6 -1.025 0.297 -3.446
COR7 -0.914 0.255 -3.579
COR8 -0.685 0.204 -3.361
COR9 -0.565 0.219 -2.576
COR10 -0.260 0.121 -2.152
COR11 -0.186 0.097 -1.908
COR12 -0.198 0.103 -1.925
COR13 -0.199 0.108 -1.843
COR14 -0.080 0.094 -0.852
COR15 -0.095 0.081 -1.173
COR16 -0.128 0.089 -1.438
COR17 -0.158 0.073 -2.163
COR18 -0.202 0.083 -2.450
COR19 -0.229 0.085 -2.711
COR20 -0.178 0.092 -1.931
COR21 -0.155 0.102 -1.518
FH2 -0.017 0.090 -0.192
FH3 -0.036 0.068 -0.532
FH4 0.022 0.083 0.262
FH5 0.015 0.067 0.224
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FH6 0.038 0.094 0.404
FH7 0.362 0.116 3.131
FH8 0.037 0.117 0.316
FH9 -0.045 0.097 -0.463
FH10 0.077 0.092 0.830
FH11 0.170 0.096 1.767
FH12 0.085 0.047 1.802
FH13 -0.087 0.065 -1.340
FH14 -0.037 0.061 -0.611
FH15 -0.014 0.056 -0.253
FH16 0.024 0.063 0.388
FH17 0.026 0.077 0.338
FH18 0.070 0.065 1.070
FH19 0.122 0.072 1.692
FH20 0.008 0.047 0.171
FH21 -0.026 0.053 -0.490
COR2 ON
COR1 0.221 0.084 2.614
FH1 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR3 ON
COR2 0.204 0.140 1.456
FH2 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR4 ON
COR3 0.168 0.181 0.931
FH3 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR5 ON
COR4 0.108 0.207 0.522
FH4 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR6 ON
COR5 0.116 0.212 0.545
FH5 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR7 ON
COR6 0.185 0.181 1.021
FH6 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR8 ON
COR7 0.323 0.148 2.184
FH7 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR9 ON
COR8 0.373 0.160 2.331
FH8 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR10 ON
COR9 0.602 0.100 6.006
FH9 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR11 ON
COR10 0.666 0.087 7.695
FH10 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR12 ON
COR11 0.659 0.086 7.643
FH11 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR13 ON
COR12 0.633 0.101 6.269
FH12 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
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COR14 ON
COR13 0.698 0.075 9.338
FH13 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR15 ON
COR14 0.726 0.081 8.954
FH14 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR16 ON
COR15 0.705 0.097 7.302
FH15 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR17 ON
COR16 0.687 0.065 10.630
FH16 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR18 ON
COR17 0.631 0.086 7.349
FH17 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR19 ON
COR18 0.585 0.084 6.943
FH18 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR20 ON
COR19 0.641 0.093 6.867
FH19 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
COR21 ON
COR20 0.651 0.112 5.809
FH20 -0.039 0.006 -6.180
FH2 ON
FH1 0.989 0.020 50.336
COR1 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH3 ON
FH2 0.992 0.014 68.642
COR2 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH4 ON
FH3 0.963 0.017 57.532
COR3 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH5 ON
FH4 0.969 0.015 66.331
COR4 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH6 ON
FH5 1.000 0.021 46.999
COR5 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH7 ON
FH6 0.864 0.026 33.568
COR6 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH8 ON
FH7 0.920 0.027 33.637
COR7 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH9 ON
FH8 0.965 0.023 42.225
COR8 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH10 ON
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FH9 0.973 0.022 45.176
COR9 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH11 ON
FH10 0.935 0.023 40.910
COR10 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH12 ON
FH11 0.982 0.011 89.055
COR11 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH13 ON
FH12 0.992 0.016 63.385
COR12 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH14 ON
FH13 0.995 0.015 66.819
COR13 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH15 ON
FH14 0.953 0.015 65.229
COR14 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH16 ON
FH15 0.982 0.017 58.133
COR15 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH17 ON
FH16 0.971 0.020 48.395
COR16 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH18 ON
FH17 0.969 0.017 56.707
COR17 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH19 ON
FH18 0.954 0.019 50.287
COR18 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH20 ON
FH19 0.991 0.013 76.532
COR19 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
FH21 ON
FH20 0.985 0.014 68.069
COR20 -0.008 0.019 -0.437
OMAUTCOR WITH
COR1 -1.094 0.098 -11.125
FH1 1.678 0.318 5.284
COR1 WITH
FH1 -2.870 0.519 -5.528
COR2 WITH
FH2 -0.045 0.086 -0.522
COR3 WITH
FH3 -0.043 0.061 -0.713
COR4 WITH
FH4 -0.002 0.065 -0.028
COR5 WITH
FH5 -0.007 0.048 -0.151
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COR6 WITH
FH6 0.011 0.092 0.119
COR7 WITH
FH7 -0.056 0.072 -0.783
COR8 WITH
FH8 -0.084 0.082 -1.027
COR9 WITH
FH9 -0.038 0.071 -0.527
COR10 WITH
FH10 -0.024 0.083 -0.290
COR11 WITH
FH11 0.003 0.060 0.048
COR12 WITH
FH12 -0.012 0.029 -0.419
COR13 WITH
FH13 -0.032 0.038 -0.845
COR14 WITH
FH14 0.036 0.038 0.934
COR15 WITH
FH15 0.016 0.043 0.359
COR16 WITH
FH16 -0.001 0.041 -0.018
COR17 WITH
FH17 -0.028 0.078 -0.354
COR18 WITH
FH18 -0.038 0.054 -0.699
COR19 WITH
FH19 -0.063 0.071 -0.888
COR20 WITH
FH20 -0.016 0.050 -0.321
COR21 WITH
FH21 0.000 0.038 0.003
Means
COR1 2.871 0.120 23.994
FH1 -6.220 0.297 -20.964
Intercepts
COR2 1.990 0.274 7.257
COR3 2.043 0.398 5.134
COR4 2.128 0.508 4.193
COR5 2.260 0.619 3.651
COR6 2.281 0.622 3.668
COR7 2.046 0.511 4.002
COR8 1.635 0.439 3.727
COR9 1.481 0.457 3.243
COR10 0.898 0.285 3.149
COR11 0.717 0.240 2.994
COR12 0.812 0.247 3.293
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COR13 0.845 0.287 2.947
COR14 0.769 0.225 3.411
COR15 0.657 0.249 2.637
COR16 0.757 0.290 2.610
COR17 0.768 0.190 4.053
COR18 1.015 0.268 3.790
COR19 1.360 0.268 5.069
COR20 0.973 0.332 2.931
COR21 0.999 0.391 2.556
FH2 0.003 0.149 0.023
FH3 0.011 0.116 0.098
FH4 -0.036 0.132 -0.276
FH5 -0.040 0.114 -0.352
FH6 0.154 0.153 1.004
FH7 -0.456 0.187 -2.444
FH8 -0.188 0.184 -1.020
FH9 -0.042 0.151 -0.275
FH10 -0.299 0.142 -2.115
FH11 -0.305 0.154 -1.990
FH12 0.046 0.083 0.551
FH13 0.114 0.108 1.056
FH14 -0.014 0.101 -0.135
FH15 -0.032 0.098 -0.330
FH16 -0.071 0.108 -0.661
FH17 -0.054 0.128 -0.420
FH18 -0.145 0.111 -1.301
FH19 -0.033 0.121 -0.270
FH20 0.066 0.088 0.748
FH21 0.088 0.095 0.924
Variances
COR1 2.136 0.239 8.953
FH1 16.376 1.698 9.644
OMAUTCOR 1.000 0.000 0.000
Residual Variances
COR2 0.482 0.086 5.611
COR3 0.388 0.093 4.164
COR4 0.310 0.099 3.121
COR5 0.321 0.078 4.101
COR6 0.416 0.102 4.097
COR7 0.388 0.093 4.181
COR8 0.411 0.080 5.154
COR9 0.576 0.092 6.247
COR10 0.512 0.083 6.197
COR11 0.475 0.117 4.044
COR12 0.463 0.125 3.698
COR13 0.454 0.099 4.561
COR14 0.509 0.096 5.324
COR15 0.477 0.111 4.297
COR16 0.425 0.123 3.441
COR17 0.436 0.099 4.428
COR18 0.465 0.101 4.600
COR19 0.465 0.075 6.191
COR20 0.466 0.097 4.783
COR21 0.449 0.125 3.584
FH2 0.882 0.092 9.635
FH3 0.539 0.056 9.639
FH4 0.700 0.073 9.636
FH5 0.546 0.057 9.641
FH6 1.109 0.115 9.640
FH7 1.673 0.177 9.474
FH8 1.688 0.177 9.512
FH9 1.133 0.119 9.509
FH10 1.034 0.109 9.449
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FH11 1.189 0.126 9.418
FH12 0.257 0.027 9.354
FH13 0.504 0.055 9.233
FH14 0.452 0.050 9.131
FH15 0.391 0.045 8.655
FH16 0.493 0.058 8.569
FH17 0.706 0.083 8.541
FH18 0.507 0.060 8.471
FH19 0.610 0.072 8.432
FH20 0.257 0.031 8.361
FH21 0.323 0.039 8.327
QUALITY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
Average Condition Number for the Information Matrix 0.262E-02
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C.2.3 Input Instructions for the Nonrecursive (No Lag) Causal
Model
title: Causal;
data: file is c:\mplus\dis\rndflat.dat;
type=imputation;
variable: names are ORIG PROT PROTCOL BRITCOL CATHCOL COMLAW FEDERAL
GOVINT1-GOVINT21 GOVWAG1-GOVWAG21 COR1-COR21 FH1-FH21
ETH1-ETH21 GDP1-GDP21 IMP1-IMP21 FUEL1-FUEL21 MIN1-MIN21
STAB1-STAB21 EN1-EN21 REXP1-REXP21 AID1-AID21 FDI1-FDI21
ODA1-ODA21 govint govwage avgfh avgcor avgeth avggdp avgimp
avgfuel avgmin avgstab avgen avgrexp avgaid avgfdi avgoda;












































COR1 on FH1 (1);
COR2 on FH2 (1);
COR3 on FH3 (1);
COR4 on FH4 (1);
COR5 on FH5 (1);
COR6 on FH6 (1);
COR7 on FH7 (1);
COR8 on FH8 (1);
COR9 on FH9 (1);
COR10 on FH10 (1);
COR11 on FH11 (1);
COR12 on FH12 (1);
COR13 on FH13 (1);
COR14 on FH14 (1);
COR15 on FH15 (1);
COR16 on FH16 (1);
COR17 on FH17 (1);
COR18 on FH18 (1);
COR19 on FH19 (1);
COR20 on FH20 (1);
COR21 on FH21 (1);
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FH1 on COR1 (2);
FH2 on COR2 (2);
FH3 on COR3 (2);
FH4 on COR4 (2);
FH5 on COR5 (2);
FH6 on COR6 (2);
FH7 on COR7 (2);
FH8 on COR8 (2);
FH9 on COR9 (2);
FH10 on COR10 (2);
FH11 on COR11 (2);
FH12 on COR12 (2);
FH13 on COR13 (2);
FH14 on COR14 (2);
FH15 on COR15 (2);
FH16 on COR16 (2);
FH17 on COR17 (2);
FH18 on COR18 (2);
FH19 on COR19 (2);
FH20 on COR20 (2);






















omautcor by COR2* COR3-COR21 FH2-FH21;
omautcor with COR1 FH1;
COR1 FH1;
omautcor@1;
C.2.4 Input Instructions for the 2 Lag Causal Model
title: Causal;
data: file is c:\mplus\dis\rndflat.dat;
type=imputation;
variable: names are ORIG PROT PROTCOL BRITCOL CATHCOL COMLAW FEDERAL
GOVINT1-GOVINT21 GOVWAG1-GOVWAG21 COR1-COR21 FH1-FH21
149
ETH1-ETH21 GDP1-GDP21 IMP1-IMP21 FUEL1-FUEL21 MIN1-MIN21
STAB1-STAB21 EN1-EN21 REXP1-REXP21 AID1-AID21 FDI1-FDI21
ODA1-ODA21 govint govwage avgfh avgcor avgeth avggdp avgimp
avgfuel avgmin avgstab avgen avgrexp avgaid avgfdi avgoda;











































COR3 on FH1 (1);
COR4 on FH2 (1);
COR5 on FH3 (1);
COR6 on FH4 (1);
COR7 on FH5 (1);
COR8 on FH6 (1);
COR9 on FH7 (1);
COR10 on FH8 (1);
COR11 on FH9 (1);
COR12 on FH10 (1);
COR13 on FH11 (1);
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COR14 on FH12 (1);
COR15 on FH13 (1);
COR16 on FH14 (1);
COR17 on FH15 (1);
COR18 on FH16 (1);
COR19 on FH17 (1);
COR20 on FH18 (1);
COR21 on FH19 (1);
FH3 on COR1 (2);
FH4 on COR2 (2);
FH5 on COR3 (2);
FH6 on COR4 (2);
FH7 on COR5 (2);
FH8 on COR6 (2);
FH9 on COR7 (2);
FH10 on COR8 (2);
FH11 on COR9 (2);
FH12 on COR10 (2);
FH13 on COR11 (2);
FH14 on COR12 (2);
FH15 on COR13 (2);
FH16 on COR14 (2);
FH17 on COR15 (2);
FH18 on COR16 (2);
FH19 on COR17 (2);
FH20 on COR18 (2);






















omautcor by COR2* COR3-COR21 FH2-FH21;




C.3 SAS scripts for multilevel models
C.3.1 Pooled Predictor Effects: Corruption w/o AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest maxiter=300;
class ORIG ;
model COR = CFH CETH CGDP CIMP CFUEL CMIN CSTAB
CPROT BRITCOL COMLAW FEDERAL CGOVINT CGOVWAGE/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random intercept CETH CSTAB CIMP /type=un subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.2 Pooled Predictor Effects: Corruption w/ AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest maxiter=300;
class ORIG wave;
model COR = CFH CETH CGDP CIMP CFUEL CMIN CSTAB CPROT
BRITCOL COMLAW FEDERAL CGOVINT CGOVWAGE/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random intercept CETH CSTAB /type=un subject=ORIG;
repeated wave/type=ar(1) subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.3 Decomposed Predictor Effects: Corruption w/o AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest maxiter=300;
class ORIG ;
model COR = WCFH WCETH WCGDP WCIMP WCFUEL WCMIN WCSTAB
CAVGFH CAVGETH CAVGGDP CAVGIMP CAVGFUEL CAVGMIN CAVGSTAB
CPROT BRITCOL COMLAW FEDERAL CGOVINT CGOVWAGE/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random intercept WCETH WCSTAB WCIMP /type=un subject=ORIG;
C.3.4 Decomposed Predictor Effects: Corruption w/ AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest maxiter=300;
class ORIG wave;
model COR = WCFH WCETH WCGDP WCIMP WCFUEL WCMIN WCSTAB
CAVGFH CAVGETH CAVGGDP CAVGIMP CAVGFUEL CAVGMIN CAVGSTAB
CPROT BRITCOL COMLAW FEDERAL CGOVINT CGOVWAGE/solution ddfm=bw notest;




C.3.5 Pooled Predictor Effects: Dem. Perf. w/o AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest noitprint;
class ORIG;
model FH = CCOR CEN CREXP PROTCOL CATHCOL/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random intercept CCOR CEN CREXP /type=un subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.6 Pooled Predictor Effects: Dem. Perf. w/ AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest noitprint;
class ORIG wave;
model FH = CCOR CEN CREXP PROTCOL CATHCOL/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random CREXP /type=un subject=ORIG;
repeated wave/type=ar(1) subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.7 Decomposed Predictor Effects: Dem. Perf. w/o AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd0 noclprint covtest noitprint;
class ORIG;
model FH = WCCOR WCEN WCREXP CAVGCOR CAVGEN CAVGREXP PROTCOL CATHCOL/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random intercept WCCOR WCEN WCREXP /type=un subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.8 Decomposed Predictor Effects: Dem. Perfor. w/ AR1
Proc Mixed data=sasuser.rnd1 noclprint covtest noitprint;
class ORIG wave;
model FH = WCCOR WCEN WCREXP CAVGCOR CAVGEN CAVGREXP PROTCOL CATHCOL/solution ddfm=bw notest;
random WCREXP /type=un subject=ORIG;
repeated wave/type=ar(1) subject=ORIG;
run;
C.3.9 Perl Script to parse SAS output










$dataoutputfile= $outputfile . "dat";
$nameoutputfile= $outputfile . "nam";












if ($line =~/\s+Covariance\sParameter\sEstimates\s+/){$outputtingflag = 1;}
if ($line =~/\s+Solution\sfor\sFixed\sEffects\s+/){$outputtingflag = 1;}
if ($line =~/\s+Fit\sStatistics\s+/){$outputtingflag = 0; }
if ($line =~/\s+Model\sInformation\s+/){$outputtingflag = 0; $numbermodels++;}
if ($outputtingflag == 1 && $line =~ /.+[0-9].+/){
@linearray = split(/\s\s+/, $line);
foreach $l (@linearray){if ($l eq "."){$l = 0;}}
if($numbermodels == 1){@linearray[0] =~ s/[^\w\s-]//g; print NAMEFILE @linearray[0] . "\n";}
if (@linearray[1] =~ /.+[0-9].+/){@linearray[1] =~ s/.+E-.+/0/; @linearray[2] =~ s/.+E-.+/0/;
print DATAFILE @linearray[1] . " " . @linearray[2] . "\n";}
else{
@linearray[2] =~ s/.+E-.+/0/; @linearray[3] =~ s/.+E-.+/0/;
print DATAFILE @linearray[2] . " " . @linearray[3] . "\n";}
}
if (($line =~/.+Res\sLog\sLikelihood.+/) ||($line =~/.+AIC\s.+/) ||($line =~/.+AICC.+/) || ($line =~/.+BIC.+/) ){
$counter = $counter +1;
@fitarray = split(/\s\s+/, $line);
print FITFILE @fitarray[2] . " ";
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